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AN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF RESTITUTION

The Reverend Henri J. Renard, s.j., *is professor of philosophy at Creighton University. He received his Ph.D. from the Gregorian University and has taught there and at Saint Louis University. He is the author of a well-known series of textbooks and has written for many philosophical periodicals. This article was read at a meeting of the Philosophers' Club, Saint Louis University.*

Years ago, when I was an undergraduate student of philosophy, an interesting theory regarding the obligation of making restitution was commonly taught. Briefly it is this: Whenever, because of ignorance, the intention of the agent—that is, of the one committing the injustice—differs from the effect which results from his action, the agent is not bound in justice to repair the harm done. An example will clarify the matter. Should one, while intending to burn down the house of his enemy, destroy by mistake his neighbor's home, he is not bound in conscience to compensate for the damage done to his neighbor. Another example will bring this theory up to date. Not so long ago, in one of our more important cities, this ethical problem, or as it is commonly called by moralists, this "case of conscience," was discussed. A certain individual "borrows" an automobile without obtaining due consent of the owner, in order to take a "pleasure ride." Unintentionally he wrecks the car. Is he obliged to make restitution? The opinion expressed by the learned moralists present at this discussion was that he is not bound in conscience to do so.

Now, it is not for me to criticize a doctrine which is held in honor by a large number of excellent moralists. I confess, however, that I have always been disturbed by the thought that someone, who at this moment might be burning my house and wrecking my car, would be perfectly justified in declining to compensate me on the plea that he never intended to cause *me* any inconvenience.

Consequently, I was delighted when I ran across several texts in

St. Thomas's writings which not only demonstrate that, irrespective of intention, restitution is of obligation but also suggest by contrast a reason for the lenient view taken by the later moralists. For as we contrast these opposite doctrines, the somewhat subjectivist approach of these authors is seen to result from a failure to examine the nature of the object of the act of justice. As a consequence of this subjectivism, the mean of virtue as regards the act of justice is not a real mean but solely a mean of reason which determines the content of the just action in accordance with the intention of the agent.[1]

This is not a controversial paper. I have no intention of trying to refute moralists of international repute. Rather, I would like to propose what I believe is St. Thomas's opinion and to paraphrase some of the reasons he offers to found his solution. These reasons are consequent upon a metaphysical analysis of the object of the just action.

The problem may be stated thus: Is the moral obligation to make restitution wholly dependent upon the intention of the agent to cause an injustice? Or more positively: What should be the content of the act of justice? We propose to offer a solution through an examination of *Aquinas's approach to the problem of justice.*

The philosophy of St. Thomas, a moderate realism, is founded upon the intelligibility of "being." The real, that is to say, the existent, is the initial source of man's knowledge. Now there is perhaps no place in the writings of the Angelic Doctor where an objective approach to a given problem is more manifest than in his treatise on justice. While

[1]This problem will be examined later.

[2]". . . all things which imply order to something are distinguished (and therefore become known to us) according to the distinction of the *things* to which they are ordered" (*ST.* I-II, q. 54, a. 2). We are presupposing the acceptance of the Thomistic position as regards the epistemological problem.

[3]The moral order is not caused by an extrinsic principle, as, for example, by the will of the lawmaker. Morality is intrinsic; it results from the finality of a rational nature.

[4]Cf. *ibid.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 8. The subject matter of a habit, *materia circa quam*, is not to be confused with the subject (*subiectum*) of a science (cf. *ibid.*, q. 59, a. 1, ad 3; also *ibid.*, q. 58, a. 8). We may add that the object (*obiectum*) of an operation and radically of habit is comparable (in its relation to the habit) to the subject of a science. Cf.: "Sic. enim, se habet subiectum ad scientiam sicut obiectum ad potentiam vel habitum" (*ibid.*, I, q. 1, a. 7). Now the subject of a science is that under whose intelligibility (*ratio*) all things are studied in that science. In like manner, the object (formal) of a habit is that *ratio sub qua* all things are referred to that habit. Clearly, the object of a habit should not be identified with the subject matter, *materia circa quam*, of that habit. "Obiectum proprium virtutis est, bonum rationis consideratum in materia propria" (*ibid.*, I-II, q. 63, a. 4).

some philosophers, for example the Neo-Kantians, have proposed a justice based upon an irrational faith which flows from a categorical imperative, and others, following Rousseau, have sought in an analysis of the (subjective) rights of man a solution to the problem of justice, St. Thomas simply states and solves this problem in terms of the object of justice. What, he asks, is the object of the virtue of justice? The reason for his mode of procedure is that justice is not an imaginative fancy, not a personified abstraction, not a Kantian category; it is a reality, a habit, a disposition to certain good moral actions. Now, a habit is a potency, ordered to, and specified by, action which is the act of the potency, while the action is determined by its object.[2] Consequently, a study of the object will lead us to an objective understanding not only of the action which establishes "the just thing" (*ius* or *iustum*) but also of the intimate nature and workings of the virtue of justice.

First of all, we shall consider that the moral order is rooted in the finality of the rational nature to its last end; it consists in the relation of that nature to the absolute good.[3] Hence the moral order embraces those actions that are placed by their rational supposit inasmuch as this supposit is rational. These are the human actions, enacted by the dual causality of intellect and will; they are the voluntary, the moral acts which dispose men toward or away from their true happiness. The moral goodness of these actions consists in their rectitude; that is to say, in their order to the last end. We infer, then, that reason and will, because they are the immediate principles of the moral act, must embrace in their joint operations the entire subject matter of the realm of morals.[4]

What is the subject matter of morals? Obviously it embraces those things with which the moral act is concerned. This subject matter comprises those things regarding which the human act must be rectified; that is to say, those things which are in themselves related to man's last end. These fall under two classes: on the one hand the internal passions of the soul and on the other the external operations which relate to another. Hence all good human actions, all actions which are placed by man insofar as he is rational, will be concerned either with the moderation and control of the passions—and these are the subject matter of fortitude and temperance—or with man's proper

relations and dealings with other men—and these constitute the subject matter for justice.[5]

This distinction between the subject matter of the various moral virtues is the basis for the difference in the approach to the study of fortitude and temperance on the one hand and of justice on the other. The first (that is to say, the approach to fortitude and temperance) will consist largely in the study of the action. It will be psychological from the point of view of subject. The other (that is, the approach to justice) will be metaphysical, from the point of view of the object. Moreover, this distinction, as we shall observe, is the reason for the difference in gauging the morality of the act of the various moral virtues.[6]

How does this difference of approach in gauging the morality of the action work out in the concrete?

First of all, as regards the *interior* emotions or passions, the moral good or evil should be viewed in the light of the personal disposition of the agent toward such an operation. The morality of the act, therefore, will be gauged not merely objectively, not merely as to the term of operation, but according as the agent is well or ill affected by these operations. Only in this wise—that is to say, as related to the individual agent (person)—will the passions or emotions (that is, the internal affections of the soul) be rectified through the dispositions of the moral virtues of temperance and fortitude.[7]

[5]It is true that any act of the reason —for example, the study of a science— can, by a previous act of the will, be ordered *toward* or *away from* man's last end. For actions of the intellect are not *of themselves* related necessarily to the last end in one direction rather than another. These operations will be classified under the subject matter of morals only by reason of the direction of the will-act which governs them. On the other hand, a willed inordinate passion and any act of injustice lack in themselves the proper rectitude, while a voluntary rendering to another what is his due is in itself properly related to the end.

[6]The more recent moralists seem to have neglected this distinction. They failed to realize its importance and consequently gauged the act from a subjective point of view.

[7]Cf. *ibid.*, I-II, q. 60, a. 2. It will generally happen that the good of the virtue of justice is neglected because of an inordinate passion which affects the judgment of reason. The workings of the distinct moral virtues are intimately correlated. (Cf. *ibid.*, II-II, q. 123, a. 1.)

[8]"The [subject] matter of justice is the external operation according as this very operation, or the things used in that operation, has a *due* (*debitam*) relation (*proportionem*) to another person" (*ibid.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 10).

[9]"Medium rationis est medium rei." Cf. *ibid.*, I-II, q. 60, a. 2, and q. 64, a. 2; *ibid.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 10.

[10]*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 64, a. 2.

[11]". . . omne medium virtutis est medium rationis" (*ibid.*).

On the other hand, certain *external* operations, those which relate to another person, are found to be morally good or morally evil objectively, irrespective of the capacity, the conditions, and emotional state of the agent. These external operations are good or evil morally because of the relation to another, no matter how well or ill the subject may be disposed and affected by them. The moral goodness, the moral evil, in these external operations lies solely in the nature of the relation to the other (*secundum rationem commensurationis ad alterum*). The virtue and action which have for their subject matter external operations related to another, these we call justice. The function of justice, therefore, is to rectify those external operations which relate to another.[8]

The Mean of Justice

Since justice is limited to those operations which relate to another, since moreover the moral goodness of these external operations depends solely upon the order of relation to another, we are able to infer an important truth. This truth will be a directive in judging the moral value of an act of justice. It is this: "As regards justice, *the mean of reason is a real mean.*" [9]

This statement demands clarification. "A mean of virtue," declares St. Thomas, "signifies that which is put by reason in any subject matter." [10] The measure and norm of an individual moral act is discovered and expressed by our reasoning power, which judges the objective morality of an action in accordance with knowledge of the law (right reason). Hence the moral goodness of a human action depends upon its conformity with *the measure of reason.* This measure is called a "mean," because, in accord with the limited perfection of human nature, a norm must avoid and reject excesses as well as defects. Consequently, the mean for any moral act, and therefore even for an act of justice, is always primarily a mean of reason.[11]

The point we make is that, while the mean of virtue for the moral virtues of temperance and fortitude could only be a mean of reason, the mean of justice must also be real. For the judgment of reason as to the moral value of an act of justice—that is to say, as to the moral value of an operation which relates to another—in no way depends upon any subjective disposition of the agent. It is based entirely upon that which is due the other; it is therefore objectively real. Hence,

"as regards justice, the mean of reason is a real mean." With regard to the moral virtues which are concerned with the passions, the mean of virtue is not a real mean. The reason is that an objective consideration of the subject matter will not suffice to determine the moral value of the operation. We must always refer the operation to the subject of the act and consider his personal dispositions in order to form a correct judgment of the moral value of the operation. For men are emotionally affected in a different manner by the same object because of condition, places, and inherited or acquired dispositions. Hence, the mean of those moral virtues (fortitude and temperance) which are concerned with the passions of the soul is solely a mean of reason.

In short, in our examination of the place of justice in the moral order we arrived at an understanding of two important truths. (*a*) The subject matter of justice embraces, and is limited to, those operations which relate to another. (*b*) In forming a true judgment of the moral value of an operation which relates to another, the mean of the virtue is not merely a mean of reason; it is a real mean.[12]

What Is the Object of Justice?

We are now prepared to proceed to an examination of the object of justice.

[12]The mean of virtue can be interpreted as an immediate norm as regards the individual moral act. Hence the mean will differ for each individual action. The object (*ratio formalis*), however, is always the same for each virtue. It is, as St. Thomas puts it, the *bonum rationis in materia virtutis*, the good of reason in the subject matter of the virtue.

[13]Similar to the *subject* of a science (cf. *ibid.*, I, q. 1, a. 7), the *object* of a habit is that reality under whose intelligibility all things comprised in the subject matter of that habit must be referred to the habit. *Object* and *subject matter* of a habit are not identical. The subject matter of a habit embraces the things about which the habit is concerned. The subject matter of justice comprises external operations which are related to another. The object, on the other hand, is the *end* and *term* of an action. "Ad actum potentiae activae comparatur obiectum ut terminus et finis" (*ibid.*, I, q. 77, a. 3.) An operation of justice has for its term and end to cause "the just thing." "The just thing" therefore, or as St. Thomas calls it, the *ius* or *iustum*, is the object of justice.

[14]The Latin word *ius* is sometimes rendered by *right* or *rights*, as in Rousseau's celebrated phrase, "the rights of man." In the language of St. Thomas *ius* and *iustum* have a totally different meaning and should *not* be rendered by *right* or *rights*. The reason is that *right* or *rights* ordinarily signifies (subjective) power (*potestas*) to do or to exact something, as in the phrase, "the right to vote." On the other hand, the term *ius* or *iustum* is not a power vested in an individual subject; rather it is the term and the end of an operation of justice. Hence, *ius* or *iustum* should be rendered "that which is just," or, better, "the just thing."

Habits are dispositions to actions; they imply order to something to be attained; they manifest finality to a term. This term is the object.[13] Hence, to ask "What is the true nature of justice?" is to ask "What is the object of justice?" St. Thomas's answer is that the object of justice is "the just thing," the *ius* or *iustum*.[14]

What do we understand when we state that the object of justice is "the just thing"?

In general the object of any good habit, whether intellectual or moral, is a good (*bonum*) suitable to the nature of the agent. For virtue is the disposition of a faculty which inclines the subject to perfect itself by action. Hence, the object of any virtue is a good, a perfection suitable to the individual nature of the rational agent (person).

Not every virtue, however, necessarily rectifies the operation of the agent; not every good habit necessarily orders man's free action to his end. A good habit of the speculative intellect, for example, may be used to cause moral evil. Only the moral virtues, which necessarily rectify the voluntary act, order man to his last end. The reason is that the object of these virtues is not merely that which is good and suitable to nature; rather, this object properly relates to the end. In other words, because the object of the moral virtues is in accord with the finality of nature which founds the moral law, this object is not merely good but possesses rectitude. It is *the right thing*.

When, however, we examine the rectitude of the acts and objects of the moral virtues, we observe a further distinction. The rectitude of those virtues which are in the sense appetite is discovered by referring the term of the operation solely to the individual rational agent. On the other hand, in the operations which relate to another, and are attributed to justice, the rectitude is not constituted by a reference to the individual agent. This rectitude, his "right" order to the end, is founded upon a *relation of due equality to another*.

The object of justice, therefore, is not merely "the right thing" but "the just thing"; it implies a rectitude, an order to the end based upon a relation of *due equality* to another. To do "the just thing" we must establish a certain equality with another by giving him his due. The end and term of the virtue of justice, the establishing this due equality

with another, is the object of justice, the *ius* or *iustum*, "the just thing." [15]

To sum up. The object of any virtue is that which is good or suitable to the nature (*bonum*). The object of any moral virtue is that which is ordered to the last end, that which has rectitude (*rectum*). The object of the virtue of justice is that which establishes a due equality with another. It is "the just thing" (*ius* or *iustum*). The object of justice is a reality, a "due equality" which results from

[15]It seems that the notion of *due* equality which is established by the *ius* or *iustum*, "the just thing," presupposes an understanding of right or rights which is a *potestas* (a moral power to have, to hold, to possess) to that which is *due*. For if an equality is *due* to another, this other has a right to that equality. Yet, at this point, Thomas has nothing to say about rights; it is only much later, in the question on the right of property, that he brings up a discussion of what *right* means. Obviously, St. Thomas, unlike more recent moralists, does not seem to have been bothered much by the general problem of rights. Why? Perhaps there is no real problem here. The reason is that definite rights are always presupposed and indicated, at least implicitly, by the precept of law. Indeed, we say that the basis for the validity as well as for our knowledge of any right is simply the law. A true law expresses moral obligation. Now, if one has an obligation to fulfill, he must have a right, a moral power (*potestas*), to whatever is necessary for the normal observance of this obligation. The absoluteness or the relativity of a right will necessarily depend upon the absoluteness and relativity of the precept of law. If the law flows immediately from the finality of nature, the obligation to the observance of the precepts is absolute. This, of course, is the case with the precepts of the natural law. Hence the rights to those things which are required for the observance of the natural law are absolute rights. The precept of the natural law, for example, which forbids self-destruction implies a natural right (subjective) to the necessities of life. This type of moral power flows from the nature; it is a property of nature and can never be destroyed. Now, all that we have just stated regarding the nature and origin of rights seems fairly obvious, and this may well be the reason why Thomas has nothing to say about rights when he approaches the problem of the object of justice, which establishes a due equality and supposes the right of another to that equality. To him the proposition that man has natural rights is self-evident.

[16]The juridical field embraces those external operations which relate to another. ". . . proprium est iustitiae inter alias virtutes ut ordinet hominem in his quae sunt *ad alterum*" (*ibid.*, II-II, q. 57, a. 1).

[17]The equality required by justice (*quaedam aequalitas*) is a *due equality*.

[18]". . . etiam non considerato qualiter ab agente fiat" (*ibid.*). It would seem from the expression *qualiter* that in Aquina's doctrine involuntariness does not excuse one from making restitution. This problem will be examined later.

[19]"Iustum dicitur aliquid quasi habens rectitudinem iustitiae ad quod terminatur actio iustitiae" (*ibid.*).

[20]"Ius est res iusta, est res debita . . . Opus adaequatum alteri" (*ibid.*, a. 2). The end of an act of justice is not precisely that the one who has more—or even too much—may have less but rather that he who has *less than his due may receive what is his due.* The notion therefore that in justice all men should receive equal goods is in no way founded upon a true notion of justice. The equality established by justice consists in rendering to another that which is due, not in giving everyone the same equal amount.

an external operation. This operation implies "otherness" because of something due to the other.[16] This equality is obtained by giving to the other his due.[17] Consequently this equality is measured without any consideration of how it is caused by the agent[18] and only in accord with what is due the other (*secundum rationem commensurationis ad alterum*). Hence the mode of justice is *strictly objective*, so that in judging of "that which is just," the mean of reason is a real mean. Consequently, the primary reference regards that which is due to the other, that which re-establishes equality. "The just thing," therefore, is that which in a manner possesses the very rectitude of justice.[19] It is the term of the just action.

From this study of the *object* of justice we infer (in a general manner) the moral rectitude of the act and of the nature of the inclination of justice. For this object is the term and end of the just action and of the virtuous inclination. Consequently there can be no inclination and no action of the virtue of justice when the object of the act is not "the just thing."

The object of justice is "that which is just," the thing due to the other which establishes equality.[20]

Injustice

We stated that our problem is to determine the true content of the act of justice; to discover whether the action, which by causing "the just thing" establishes the due equality, must necessarily include restitution. Now, the re-establishing of due equality by the agent generally presupposes an actual or a potential injustice, an undue inequality in the other (in the patient). In order to determine the true content of the just act which repairs adequately an actual or futural injustice, it will be helpful to understand and to probe the structure of injustice.

Paralleling justice, injustice implies two distinct persons. One, the agent, by its action (*actio*), causes the inequality; the other, the patient or victim, suffers (*passio*) this inequality. Two factors, therefore, are necessary to establish the (formal) inequality of injustice; two elements must enter into its constitution—an action and a sufferance.

Consequently, in order to judge whether the inequality caused by

the *agent* and suffered by the *patient* is a real (formal) injustice and in order to determine what is necessary to re-establish the equality of justice, we should ascertain whether the *action* on the part of the agent and the *sufferance* (*passio*) of the patient are truly (formally) unjust.

The action of the agent will be an unjust action only if it be voluntary, so that the guilt of the evil act be imputable to the author of the act. For the injustice which is about to be caused could not be imputed to the agent unless (*a*) "the unjust thing" is intended and therefore known and unless (*b*) the inequality of injustice results from a will-act of free choice. These two elements of the will-act, intention and free choice, are required in order that the action be truly an unjust act. For there can be no moral guilt and consequently no punishment can be inflicted (*a*) when the agent does not *intend* an injustice because of invincible ignorance as regards the objective morality of the action and (*b*) when the inequality is not caused by a will-act of choice, as when a spontaneous passion has impeded reason and made it impossible for the will to act.

In either occurrence—that is to say, whenever the agent does not intend the injustice or whenever the injustice is not caused by the will-act—the inequality is not a "formal" injustice as regards the agent.[21]

On the part of the patient or victim, the sufferance (*passio*) or harm resulting from the action of the agent is unjust only when the effect produced is, at least implicity, opposed to the will of the patient. The reason is that a man can give up what is his only through an act of his will.[22]

Hence if there has been no such will-act, the object matter is his, and for the agent to take it is to destroy the equality of justice. On the other hand, should the patient *willingly* give up his ownership, the object matter is no longer *his*, no longer *his due*. In this case, the apparent harm done is not a formal injustice on the part of the

[21]Moralists call this type of inequality material, not formal.

[22]Cf. *ibid.*, II-II, q. 59, a. 3, ad 1.

[23]"Dicendum est quod iniustum, per se et formaliter loquendo, nullus potest facere nisi *volens*, nec pati nisi *nolens*" (*ibid.*, a. 3).

[24]Only those who have the due authority can apply such retribution. Indeed, God alone, *qui scrutatur corda hominum*, is able to exact absolute retribution. We know from revelation that, in the present order of grace, man can atone for his sins through penance and good works.

patient. The reason is that since the object has been willingly surrendered to the other, it does not cause the inequality of injustice.

In short, a complete (*per se* and formal) inequality of injustice as regards both agent and patient depends upon two necessary factors. (*a*) The agent must intend and choose the inequality which he causes. (*b*) The patient, at least implicitly, is unwilling to suffer the inequality caused by the agent.[23]

From these reflections we are able to infer some general principles which should govern any act of justice in order to re-establish the due equality done away with by an injustice. The act of justice must fully repair the injustice. Hence it is necessary to repair the disorder caused by the two formal elements which constitute a real, a formal inequality of injustice. Likewise, it is imperative to know what must be done to repair an inequality when one element of injustice is lacking and *only one* is present.

Now, in a formal injustice, these two elements are an unjust action (*actio*) on the part of the agent and an unjust sufferance (*passio*) in the victimized patient. Consequently, in a formal act of justice which is to do away with the inequality, the contraries of these two elements must in some manner be realized. What are these two contraries? First, the agent must suffer (*passio*) some retribution, some punishment, in order to atone for the guilt incurred through a voluntary unjust action.[24] And, second, in order to repair the harm done to the victimized patient, full restitution (*actio*) must be made, not only as regards the object taken but also, when such is the case, for any damage suffered.

Briefly, whenever a "formal" injustice has been committed, two factors must enter in order to re-establish fully the equality of justice. *Restitution* must be made to the victim, restitution that should include adequate compensation for any harm suffered. Then there must be *retribution;* that is to say, punishment of the culprit proportioned to his guilt. This punishment, according to human law, may be exacted in the form of a fine or penal servitude and the like. Obviously, only those having the proper authority can inflict punishment.

(The term or object of this complete restoration of the equality of justice, which includes both restitution and punishment [retribution] is called by St. Thomas *contrapassum. Contrapassum* [literally, "that

which is suffered in return"] we shall render imperfectly by the word *reciprocity*. Reciprocity, therefore, implies full compensation for the harm done to the patient and for the guilt of the agent.[25])

We may now easily infer how the inequality of injustice is removed and the equality of justice re-established by act or acts of commutative justice. Three possible cases and three solutions are offered.

The injustice is formal only as regards the patient. In this case a real injury has been caused to the unwilling patient but without guilt on the part of the agent. This may be due to one of two possibilities. Either the agent is invincibly ignorant (no intention) of the injury he is about to cause to another, or the action results not from the free act of choice but from a spontaneous passion.

The solution of this case is that the act of justice which re-establishes equality should, in either supposition, be limited to making full restitution for injury caused. Obviously no punishment, no retribution is required to atone for the malice of the act. The agent either did not intend, or did not choose to cause, an inequality of injustice. Consequently, there is no malice and no guilt.

A difficult problem arises at this point. Is one bound to make restitution when the action which causes injury to another is placed in accordance with the principle of the double effect so that there is no intention to cause the injury? We answer that the principles proposed by St. Thomas seem to demand restitution whenever possible. The reason is that although no evil moral act is placed and no guilt is incurred, since the injury is not intended, nevertheless harm to an unwilling patient has been caused. The inequality of injustice on the part of the patient must be done away with, and equality of justice re-established through restitution.

[25]*Contrapassum* will not be had by a mere restitution of the object taken and compensation for the harm done. The culprit should receive a "sufferance" to atone for the malice of the evil act. "Hoc quod dicitur contrapassum importat aequalem recompensationem passionis ad actionem precedentem" (*ibid.*, II-II, q. 61, a. 4). Hence *contrapassum* will include two elements, restitution and punishment.

St. Thomas adds that "reciprocity (*contrapassum*) has no place in distributive justice" (*ibid.*). The reason is that restitution to the injured party, as well as the punishment inflicted on the guilty, is demanded in justice, not because of what the agent is *as a person* but simply because of *his action* which caused inequality of injustice. Distributive justice, however, is not concerned with things and actions, exchanges, rewards, and punishment for actions. It looks solely to proportional equality according to person. *Contrapassum*, therefore, *belongs solely to commutative justice*. (Cf. Marie Louise Martinez, R.S.C.J., "Distributive Justice according to St. Thomas," The Modern Schoolman, May, 1947.)

The inequality of injustice is formal as regards the agent only. In this case, although the agent intends and freely chooses to cause an injustice to another, no harm is really done to the other. The reason may be that the intended victim had already willed to give this object to the agent and consequently had relinquished his ownership.

The solution of this case is that since no sufferance (*passio*) had been endured by the patient, no restitution is required. Some punishment (*passio*), however, or atonement on the part of the agent is necessary to make retribution for the evil act of injustice.

Finally, whenever the two formal factors constitute "the unjust thing," the equality of "the just thing" is fully re-established through reciprocity (*contrapassum*), which includes restitution and retribution.

Conclusion

In concluding this paper I should like once more to recall the fundamental fact in St. Thomas's theory of justice. This theory through and through presents an objective approach; that is to say, the object rather than the subject is the source of inquiry. Because of this objective point of view, the inferences drawn avoid the pitfalls of idealism and the dead-ends of skepticism.

An understanding of the object of justice indicates that this object relates to another and is constituted by a *due equality.* From this analysis two factors, agent and patient, which are causally necessary for the equality of justice, are proposed to our reflection.

Because the causing of the equality of justice presupposes at least a potential injustice and in order to evaluate the influx produced by these two causal factors (agent and patient) upon the due equality of justice, we proposed an examination of the nature of injustice. Two inferences were drawn. The patient must be duly compensated in order that the equality of justice be restored (restitution). And the agent must atone for his evil deed (retribution).

An understanding of the nature of these two causal elements will manifest a clear distinction between restitution and retribution. Only through such understanding can we hope to solve the practical problems which arise daily in our social and professional dealings with our fellowmen.

Chronicle

At Loyola University's Lewis Towers, in downtown Chicago, a symposium was held on November 6, 1958, on the topic "The Emergence of Personality in Ancient Society." Four papers were given: "The Relation of the Individual to His Family," by Dr. E. A. Speiser of the University of Pennsylvania; "The Relation of the Individual to Political Society," by Dr. George B. Mendenhall of the University of Michigan; "The Relation of the Individual to His Cult," by the Reverend Louis Zabkar of Loyola University in Chicago; and "The Person as a Self-conscious Individual," by the Reverend John L. McKenzie, S.J., of West Baden College of Loyola University.

The Third East-West Philosophers' Conference, sponsored by the University of Hawaii, will be held June 22 to July 31, 1959, in Honolulu. The theme will be "East-West Philosophy in Practical Perspective." The work of the conference will be divided into six one-week sections, each dealing with one aspect of the subject, as follows: the relation of philosophical theories to practical affairs; natural science and technology in relation to cultural institutions and social practice; religion and spiritual values; ethics and social practice; political, legal, and economic philosophy; and conspectus of practical implications for world understanding and co-operation. The program will include regular conference meetings (three evenings each week), special seminars for associate members, a series of public lectures by representatives of East and West, and special courses in the summer school of the University of Hawaii. Some forty scholars from East and West will prepare papers and lead discussions. Members will be specialists who are invited or come on their own initiative. Associate members will be invited from among younger teachers of philosophy, humanities, and social sciences. There is no fee for attending the conference, but seminars and courses have a tuition fee. Further information can be obtained from Professor Charles A. Moore, Director, East-West Philosophers' Conference, University of Hawaii, Honolulu 14, Hawaii.

(Continued on p. 108.)

A PROPOSITIONS

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The present paper is a follow-up on the article entitled "Existential Import and 'Latin Averroism,'"[1] and both of them are developments upon the article "Is the Square Back in Opposition?"[2] Now, while in the latter we had suggested that only some *A* propositions might be nonexistential, when we came afterwards to discuss Averroism we put forward the hypothesis that *all* universal affirmatives of *necessary* predication were nonexistential. This hypothesis, we said, was a logical consequence of the doctrine of creation. Our point could be put in the following way. The proposition "Every creature is such that its essence does not include its existence" is a logical consequence of the doctrine of creation. But all the categories of being with all their subordinate genera and species come under the heading of "creature." Therefore any essential predication about any category of being or its subspecies is nonexistential. For example, the proposition "Every man is rational" is true even though no men ever existed. It tells us only about the nature of man; it gives us no information at all about whether there *are* any men.

The Averroists, however, held a position contrary to the above. In the person of their leader, Siger of Brabant, they held that propositions of the type "Every man is rational" are true only if there exist instances of the subject term.[3] Propositions, therefore, of this type require an *eternal* world with *eternally membered* species to serve as underpinning for the evidently eternal truth of such propositions. As can be imagined, neither Albertus Magnus nor St. Thomas Aquinas admitted such a theory. In this paper we try to show how, in a

Thomist system, universal propositions of essential predication can only be nonexistential.

One point is worth noting at the outset. The controversy over existential import generally takes place between mathematical logicians and Aristotelians. Our purpose is to take it out of this context since it does not belong there. Admittedly the mathematical logicians can take the credit for fixing attention today upon the problem itself. Nevertheless, it has no exclusive connection with either mathematical logic in general or with material implication in particular. Those logicians, therefore, who equated this question with the "errors," as they termed them, of mathematical logicians quite missed the point.

And the facts of history justify our procedure. Joyce, we grant, places the origins of the problem in the modern period. He says that the question of the existential import in categorical propositions "seems to have first been raised explicitly by the German philosopher Herbart (1776-1841)"[4]—and no doubt Herbart did revive it. But it was known five hundred years before his time. The title itself of Siger of Brabant's *Questio utrum Hec Sit Vera: Homo Est Animal Nullo Homine Existente* shows this. And Siger was not the first to have raised the question. As Pierre Mandonnet says: "The latter [namely, Siger] seems to allude to the antiquity of the problem. In any case, it had already been put formally and in the same terms by

[1]T. Gierymski and M. P. Slattery, "Existential Import and 'Latin Averroism,'" *Franciscan Studies*, XVIII (June, 1958).

[2]T. Gierymski and M. P. Slattery, "Is the Square Back in Opposition?" *Philosophical Studies* (Maynooth), VII (December 1957), 123-30. Cf. n. 20 of this article for the source of the article mentioned above; and cf. *ibid.*, n. 17, as being a partial source for the present paper.

[3] Cf. article mentioned in n. 1. Cf. also Lottie H. Kendzierski, "Eternal Matter and Form in Siger of Brabant," THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXXIII (March 1955), 223-41 (especially 237-41).

[4]G. H. Joyce, S.J., *Principles of Logic* (3d ed. "Stonyhurst Philosophical Series." Longman's, 1926). p. 111.

[5]"La question . . . était en circulation avant d'être reprise par Siger. Celui-ci semble faire allusion à l'ancienneté du problème. En tout cas, il avait déjà été posé formellement et dans les mêmes termes par Albert le Grand" (*Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIII^me siècle* [Fribourg, Suisse, 1899], p. CXXXVIII). For the allusion made by Siger, see *ibid.*, Append., p. 54, 1.14, where Siger says ". . . et apparet ex praedictis manifeste causa contradiccionis antiqua de veritate huius proposicionis, homo est animal nullo homine existente."

[6]"Pour Siger, la position est tout autre. En strict aristotélicien, il n'accepte pas l'universel antérieurement à l'existence des singuliers" (*ibid.*, p. CXXXVIII).

[7]*Ibid.*, p. CXXXIX. See also Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1932), chap. 4.

[8]Arthur Little, S.J., *The Platonic Heritage of Thomism* (Dublin: Standard House, 1949), p. XV.

Albert the Great."[5] Mandonnet goes on to say that Siger, "as a strict Aristotelian . . . does not accept the universal before the existence of the singulars,"[6] and to point out the logical connection between Siger's doctrine here and the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world to which he also subscribed.[7]

Accordingly we intend to treat the question in the context in which, evidently, it arose and to treat it as connected with the fundamental philosophical questions of the time, which thinkers like Siger evidently thought it was. Speaking of this period Father Little justifiably says, "The details of the historical situation . . . comprise an episode more dramatic and more crucial than any other in the history of philosophy except perhaps the death of Socrates."[8] For this was the time when the new philosophy of Aristotle, with various Neoplatonic and Arabian accretions, was fast becoming a dangerous rival to the Christian religion; and the burning question of the day was, How much, if any, of Aristotle's philosophy was compatible with Christian belief?

The Averroists, or "integral Aristotelians" of the time, led by Siger of Brabant, were maintaining that all natural truth was to be found in Aristotle and that to be a philosopher consisted in studying and commenting upon Aristotle's text. They were accused of arguing that when Aristotle's doctrine conflicted with Christian belief, then both doctrines were true, the unstated qualification being that of course only Aristotle's doctrine was really true. If is not surprising, then, that St. Thomas, who found so much that was true in Aristotle, should be looked upon with suspicion by the conservative "Augustinians" as being no different from the Averroists. So much was this the case that in the condemnation of various Averroist theses at Paris and Oxford in 1277, some of St. Thomas's theses were also included.

Now, one basic point at issue in this whole Christian-Averroist conflict was that concerning the essential eternity of the world. Aristotle taught it; so, naturally Siger held it. But one could hardly expect the Christian theologians to embrace it with joy. There is little doubt, however, that another doctrine logically connected with this Aristotelian cosmological theory has been received, or at least, not explicitly rejected by Scholastics; namely, the theory of existential import in *A* propositions. As we shall see later on, there is

general agreement that the Aristotelian logic of categorical propositions presupposes the *actual existence* of instances of the subject term. So whatever answer you give to the question of existential import will place you in one of the two opposing camps—Averroist or creationist. If, like Siger, you assert it, then you put yourself among the Averroists; if, on the other hand, you deny it, then your position is compatible with creationist metaphysics. This discussion, then, is not an artificial one.

I

Two distinctions are basic to the whole discussion. One is that between the strict *A* proposition (commonly known as the necessary universal proposition or the essential predication) and the merely enumerative *A* proposition (commonly known as a contingent proposition or an accidental predication). The other distinction is between *what* a proposition asserts and *how you find out* about its meaning and truth. If these distinctions are granted, we hope to show how necessary propositions are nonexistential, while those which are existential are merely enumerative—that is, contingent.

Now, these distinctions are not novel. The first is just a restatement of the Aristotelian distinction between the scientific proposition and a purely accidental one. The second is illustrated by St. Thomas in his description of the mode of knowledge peculiar to men and angels. Both a man and an angel can know that, for example, the physical universe is contingent. But they know it through diverse media, since a man has to make use of induction and deduction, which, according to St. Thomas, are not necessary for an angel. So although they have different ways of knowing it, the proposition is not dependent for its truth either on their knowing it or on their method of knowing it. Its truth is dependent rather on whether it correctly describes the nature of the physical universe.

Now, although discussions of existential import often seem to end in searches for palm trees in Alaska or for polygamous bachelors, we

[9]Frederick Copleston, S.J., *A History of Philosophy* ("The Bellarmine Series." Burns, Oates, & Washbourne, 1953), III, 418.

[10]Cf. H. W. B. Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic* (2nd ed., rev. Oxford, 1950), p. 177, and Jacques Maritain, *An Introduction to Logic* (Sheed & Ward, 1946), p. 227. This topic, we very much regret, did not allow us an opportunity to acknowledge our admiration for, and the debt we owe to, Maritain as a philosopher—as *the* Thomist philosopher of today.

will be concerned here only with the natural species of things. Our inquiry could in fact be regarded as a working out of the consequences in formal logic of the doctrine of creation. On this point Father Copleston says:

> Aristotle himself was concerned to explain the *how* of the world, that is to say, certain features of the world, especially change or becoming or 'movement'. With a philosopher like St. Thomas, however, there was a shift of emphasis: the problem of the *that* of the world, the problem, that is, of the existence of finite things, became primary. . . . It is possible, therefore, to call the philosophy of St. Thomas an 'existential' philosophy in a sense in which one can hardly call Aristotle's philosophy 'existential'.[9]

We think that this distinction between Aristotle and St. Thomas also holds good for logic, and for the same reasons. The problem of existential import never seems to present a difficulty to an Aristotelian logician. We suggest that it is important for Thomists.

II

First we will discuss the distinction between the true universal and the enumerative one, since this distinction is basic. Fortunately, however, there is general agreement on the point. Joseph uses the above terms "true" and "enumerative" for making the distinction, while Maritain uses "in necessary matter" and "in contingent matter."[10] As we said, this is the Aristotelian distinction between the scientific and the merely contingent proposition. For our purposes, we will speak of the essential proposition and the contingent one.

It is generally agreed that contingent propositions are existential, since they are merely statements of fact about groups of individuals. Joseph gives the example "All the French ministries are short-lived" and evidently means it to be only a description of the actual durability of the individual ministries up to the moment of writing. It was not meant to give a description of anything essential to a French ministry. So no question arises over the existential import of these contingent propositions, or enumerative universals. But since they

differ in logical type from essential propositions, there is a very serious question about the justifiability of treating them in logic under the same symbol *A*, as one treats essential propositions.

But when we come to the essential proposition, the question of existential import appears in full light; and the Aristotelians show themselves to be very indefinite on the subject. For example, Joseph says, "For a judgement is really universal, when the subject is conceptual, and the predicate attaches to the subject (or is excluded from it) necessarily";[11] then he goes on to mention the important point that "an universal judgement has nothing, as such, to do with *numbers* of instances; if the connexion affirmed in it be necessary, the judgement is still universal, whether there be a million instances of its truth or only one."[12]

The obvious question to put here is, Why stop at one? Why not say it is true even when there are *no* instances? He has told us that the subject is conceptual and that the proposition is not about "*numbers* of instances" (with his own underlining of "numbers"), in which case he should logically conclude it to be true for zero instances. And he does, in a footnote, mention that some logicians allow its truth in such circumstances. He seems to find difficulties in such a position, nevertheless, for he says that "such a view makes the universal judgement, however, purely hypothetical: cf. Leibniz . . . Bradley . . . Bosanquet . . ."[13] Although Joseph seems to have qualms about allowing a categorical proposition with zero instances to be equivalent to a hypothetical proposition, Coffey, the Thomist logician, has no such fears. He says, "It is precisely those universals which, though expressed assertorically (All S's are P, No S's are P), would be more appropriately expressed as modals, that do not imply the existence of their subjects";[14] and he later says that the two forms are interchangeable.[15]

We see on the part of Maritain the same lack of definiteness that we saw on the part of Joseph. Maritain says that a proposition in necessary matter "does not require the actual existence of the subject in order

[11] *Introduction to Logic*, p. 177.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 179.
[13] *Ibid.*, n. 1.
[14] P. Coffey, *The Science of Logic* (New York, 1938), I, 261.
[15] "If, however, we interpret the universal as not implying the existence of its subject, then the universal forms 'If an S is M it is P', and 'All SM is P' would be mutually interchangeable" (*ibid.*, p. 269).
[16] *Introduction to Logic*, p. 227.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 228.
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] The conjunction would be of the form "Every *S* is *P*," and "There are some instances of *S*."

to be true . . . and has not necessarily and of itself an 'existential' sense."[16] He says furthermore that ". . . it is not necessarily and of itself concerned with anything except the relation of the Pr. to the S., that is, with the simply ideal existence of this S. with this Pr."[17] But then he goes on to say the opposite, or nearly the opposite:

> . . . there is nothing to prevent the mind from adding an existential sense to it (the truth in this case ceasing to be an eternal truth) as it does in all universals obtained by *induction* in the experimental sciences.
>
> Every acid makes litmus paper turn red.
> Every mammal is viviparous.
>
> Taken in themselves these propositions would, no doubt, remain true even were there neither acids nor mammals, but actually we never think of them without understanding that there are acids and that there are mammals . . .[18]

Then he roundly concludes, "A proposition, whose Pr. is *essential* to the S. may also be understood as having existential import."[19]

So Maritain first tells us that the propositions are nonexistential; then he says the mind can add an existential sense to them, as happens in experimental science. Consequently they lose their eternal truth. Yet they would "no doubt" remain true even if nonexistential; and finally they can be understood as being existential. The clarity appropriate to logic could well be employed here.

We do not deny that minds can add many things to the interpretation of a proposition. But here we are concerned with the limits imposed by logic. If these propositions are true in the absence of instances, then they are nonexistential. If, on the other hand, you interpret them as existential, then you have a different type of proposition on your hands and one which is contingent. The former was a necessary proposition; the latter is a *conjunction* whose elements are a necessary proposition and a purely contingent existential one concerning the subject species.[20] So it is quite false to say that necessary propositions may also have existential import. They do not. And those which do are either conjunctions, and thus contingent, or else enumerative universals and thus equally contingent.

We will agree with Maritain that *in order to find out* their truth, we have to inspect actual instances of the types referred to by the propositions—like the acids and mammals in Maritain's examples. But, to use our second basic distinction, this concerns only our knowledge and has nothing to do with *what* the proposition asserts. So, as St. Thomas says, we have to make use of sense experience, to look at actual instances, in order to know anything at all. Take the proposition in physics that $d = 16t^2$. If its truth depended upon bodies actually falling, then it would be false before creation—which consequence raises questions about God's knowledge of physical laws, apart from anything else—or alternatively it would be false unless bodies kept on falling, which is absurd.

It is when Maritain says that necessary propositions lose their eternal truth on being taken existentially that he shows, in its fullest light, the weakness inherent in the traditional logic of the *A* proposition with its ambiguous symbolism and interpretation. Can the same proposition be both essential and contingent? Can it be both existential and nonexistential? Evidently not. But the failure of most Aristotelian logicians to come to a clear decision over the two types of so-called *A* propositions leaves them in constant danger of falling into those contradictions. The fact is that contingent *A* propositions are, strictly speaking, not universal at all. For they do not preclude the possibility of a negative instance, as can be seen from the illustrative propositions about the French ministries. Essential propositions are, on the other hand, universal. They allow of no possible exception. But they do not affirm the existence of members of the subject class.

[21]"Soit le jugement universel: 'Tout homme est mortel'. Si par ce jugement on veut signifier que 'Tout suppôt qui serait homme serait aussi mortel, et de plus il y a au moins quelque suppôt qui est homme', on dira que le jugement est 'existentiel'. Si on veut simplement signifier: 'Tout suppôt qui serait homme serait aussi mortel', sans dire qu'il existe au moins un homme, on dira que le jugement est 'non-existentiel' " (J. Dopp, *Leçons de logique formelle* [Louvain, 1950], 1re partie, p. 91).

[22]To quote van Steenberghen: "His [Siger's] philosophical system is dominated by a theory of knowledge that is strictly Aristotelian. . . . He bases the absolute value of judgements of the abstract order on the eternity of the world and all the species" (F. van Steenberghen, *Aristotle in the West* [Louvain, 1955], p. 222). See also Little, *The Platonic Heritage of Thomism*, pp. 72-73.

[23]"Il serait fort souhaitable que ces différences fussent toujours marquées dans le langage" (*Leçons de logique formelle*, p. 91).

The following is another example of the ambiguity just mentioned. Dopp says:

> Take the universal judgement: "Every man is mortal". If by this judgement one wishes to signify that "Every supposit which was man would also be mortal, and in addition there is at least one supposit which is a man", one will say that the judgement is "existential". If one simply wishes to signify: "Every supposit which was man would also be mortal", without saying that at least one man exists, one will say that the judgement is non-existential.[21]

But just as we saw with Maritain, there are two different propositions mentioned here with two different conditions of truth. One is true even though no men should exist, granted that it is a necessary proposition. The other, however, is not an *A* proposition at all. It is an implicit conjunction whose elements are a necessary and a contingent proposition; namely, "Every man is mortal" and "There are men." And the whole conjunction is contingent. There are two ways of contradicting a conjunction, since it has two elements; but there is only one accepted way of contradicting a proposition in the Square. An old objection—but a valid one.

The way to get rid of these difficulties is to remove the ambiguity. One way is to adopt the axiom which Coffey says is implicit in Aristotelian logic—namely, that there are always instances of *S* and *P* in the Square; and with this axiom the objections made against Joseph, Dopp, and Maritain will not hold. Their logic will be quite consistent—and it will be Averroist. They will have denied, implicitly, the possibility of free creation. Aristotle's logic is quite consistent, since it presupposes the natural eternity of the world and eternally membered species.[22] But Scholastic thinkers can hardly entertain the latter presuppositions. We agree with Dopp when he says that "it would be very desirable if these differences were always marked out in language."[23] For logic, it is imperative. Possibly the strangest thing in the whole controversy is the fact that the Scholastic logicians had merely to interpret essential porpositions as modal and therefore non-existential in order to avoid these difficulties. A clue to this is given in Aristotle's theory that science is of the universal and the *necessary*.

Coffey says that the assumption of existing instances of the classes *S* and *P* "appears to have underlain the traditional treatment of immediate inferences in Aristotelian logic";[24] he says furthermore that "the traditional doctrine on opposition will also hold good if the existence of S be assumed independently of the import of the propositions themselves altogether. And this appears to have been the assumption really, if only implicitly made in scholastic logic."[25] If this is the case, then an anticreationist assumption is present "really, if only implicitly," in Scholastic logic. But let us leave the cloudy air of the implicit and the ambiguous for the clear atmosphere of the explicitly defined question and the open deliberate answer to it. Take Siger. In the *Quaestio* that we mentioned above, he makes this statement:

> Furthermore, given no particular man in existence, if man is an animal, then some man is an animal—for instance, Socrates, or Plato, or Cicero. If therefore by hypothesis none of the singulars is animal, *since there are none*, then it seems that man is not an animal.[26]

[24]*Science of Logic*, I, p. 252; and cf. p. 254.

[25]*Ibid.*, p. 254.

[26]"Preterea, nullo homine particulari existente, si homo est animal, aliquis homo est animal, ut socrates, vel plato, vel cicero. Si igitur per ypothesim nullus singularium sit animal cum nullus sit, videtur etiam quod homo non sit animal" (*Questio utrum Hec Sit Vera: Homo est Animal Nullo Homine Existente*, in Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, p. 49, ll. 4-7). Italics mine.

[27]Cf. for example, "Si igitur ablatis individuis aufferantur ea sine quibus non potest esse natura humana, auferretur, et ipsa natura humana. Quia eis ablatis non manet homo aliquid in rerum natura, nec animal nec aliud" (*ibid.*, p. 51, ll. 34-35).

[28]". . . patet quod nullo existente homine particulari, adhuc est vera, homo est animal, et hujusmodi aliae locutiones" (*Lib. I De Intellectu et Intelligibili*, tract. II. c. 3 [Paris: Vives, 1890], IX, 494b).

[29]*Platonic Heritage of Thomism*, p. 159.

[30]"Socrates est rationalis quia homo est rationalis, et non e converso: unde dato quod Socrates et Plato non essent, adhuc humanae naturae rationalitas competeret" (*Quodlibet.*, VIII, a. 1). Cf. also *ST*, I, q. 55, a. 3, ad 1.

[31]"Si omnes creaturae ab esse deficerent . . . natura humana manebit talis quod ei competeret rationalitas" (*Quodlibet.*, VIII, a. 1, ad 3).

[32]*Platonic Heritage of Thomism*, p. 159, n. 3.

[33]For the general problem of the relations between Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Thomism, the reader is referred to Father Little, *Platonic Heritage of Thomism*.

[34]"Contingit tamen quandoque ratione significati eas habere contrarietatem, puta cum attribuitur aliquid universali ratione naturae universalis, quamvis non apponatur signum universale; ut cum dicitur, *homo est animal*, *homo non est animal*: quia hae enunciationes eamdem habent vim ratione significati; ac si diceretur, *omnis homo est animal*, *nullus homo est animal*" (*In Lib. I Perihermeneias*, cap. 3, lect. 5, n. 22; ed. Leonine, I, 50-51).

We can deal with a statement like this. It is quite clear, and quite false. And Siger leaves us in no doubt about what he means, since he keeps on repeating the same conclusion, after looking at other arguments, all the way through his reply.[27] Albertus Magnus is, if anything, clearer, for he lets us know that the proposition he mentions is only an example of a certain *type* of proposition, evidently the necessary proposition. He says: ". . . it is evident that, there being no particular man in existence, this is nevertheless true, *Man is an Animal*; and so are other statements of this form."[28] Once more, what he says is quite clear—and equally true. We will quote a statement by Father Little for the illustration of St. Thomas's position in the matter: ". . . he says that if neither Socrates nor Plato (nor anyone else) existed, it would still be true that man is rational."[29] The following passage from St. Thomas is given by Father Little as a reference for this assertion: "Socrates is rational because man is rational, and not conversely. Wherefore given that Socrates and Plato did not exist, rationality would still belong to humanity."[30] And this, St. Thomas goes on to say, is true even "if all creatures ceased to exist."[31] And it is very significant for this whole question that Father Little maintains that St. Thomas was replying here to Siger: "St. Thomas's attention must have been directed to this truth by its denial by Siger de Brabant denying all existence to the universal previous to the singular."[32] The two opposing views, then, are quite clearly stated. The one holds the existential interpretation of necessary propositions, with its logical partner, the natural eternity of the world. The other holds their nonexistential interpretation, a logical consequence of the doctrine of free creation. The only ambiguity which might remain now rests with the Aristotelians. After they have said, following Plato, that science is of the *universal*, why should their scientific propositions imply the *existence of individuals*? Why not merely the possibility of the latter?[33]

At this point it may be helpful to mention propositions of the form "*S* is *P*," since there has been a certain divergency of opinion about them. St. Thomas says quite clearly that such propositions have the same meaning as do universal propositions, the quantifier being understood. So they should read, "All *S* is *P*."[34] But Joyce denies this. On the contrary he says:

> In propositions such as "Man is mortal" "The oak is deciduous", the employment of the singular number shows that the immediate object of our consideration is the universal nature as abstracted. But the nature viewed in abstraction from individuals is also viewed in abstraction from existence. . . . It is otherwise with propositions expressed in the plural, e.g. "All oaks are deciduous". Propositions of this class . . . most certainly suppose the existence of both subject and predicate *in rerum natura.*[35]

One thing can be said about this interpretation of necessary *A* propositions: it is clear—and Averroist.

Maritain disagrees with Joyce on the interpretation of the form "*S* is *P*," for Maritain evidently takes it as existential. He says:

> When I say: "Man is social", the word "man" not only represents (renders present to my mind) human *nature* (considered in an abstract universal), but it also takes the place for me of the extra-mental thing of the individuals to which sociability is attributed by the copula *is.*[36]

So presumably "Man is social" is existential. When Joyce disagrees with St. Thomas over the identification of the two forms, and with Maritain over their existential import, we agree with St. Thomas against Joyce and with Joyce against Maritain.

There have been three sorts of existential import known to philosophy, and St. Thomas rejects all of them. The first is the Platonic, the second is the Aristotelian, and the third is St. Anselm's. The first posited a reality which was itself an Idea represented by the abstract idea in my mind. The second posited the eternal existence of membered species as the objects represented by our ideas of each species. The

[35] *Principles of Logic*, pp. 112-13.

[36] *Introduction to Logic*, p. 62.

[37] "Sic igitur patet quod essentia divina, in quantum est absolute perfecta, potest accipi ut propria ratio singulorum. . . . Augustinus dicit, quod Deus alia ratione fecit hominem et alia equum; et rationes rerum pluraliter in mente divina esse dicit. In quo etiam aliqualiter salvatur Platonis opinio ponentis ideas, secundum quas formarentur omnia quae in rebus materialibus existunt" (*CG* I, cap. 54).

[38] "Deus est prima causa exemplaris omnium rerum . . . Deus est primum exemplar omnium" (*ST* I, q. 44, a. 3). See also: "A primo igitur per suam essentiam ente et bono, unumquodque potest dici bonum et ens, inquantum participat ipsum per modum cujusdam assimilationis; licet remote et deficienter" (*ibid.*, q. 6, a. 4). See also n. 39.

[39] "Propria enim natura uniuscujusque consistit secundum quod per aliquem modum divinam perfectionem participat" (*ST* I, q. 14, a. 6).

third posited the existence of God as the object properly represented by the idea we could form of God. Now, while St. Thomas rejected each as they stood, he did agree with them in part. In the case of Plato and St. Anselm, he rejected their methods and agreed with the conclusions—in a modified way for Plato. For Aristotle, he agreed with his methods, but, in this case, rejected his conclusion as regards an eternal world. So St. Thomas says that the Platonic doctrine of Ideas is saved to some extent, as these Ideas are in the mind of God.[37] God is the universal exemplar which all beings copy imperfectly and in whose perfections all beings participate.[38] St. Thomas denies that we have any adequate idea of God, and this is what would be necessary for an argument a priori of God's existence. We have to prove God's existence from creatures, a posteriori, which method will show that God exists necessarily. St. Thomas will agree with Aristotle that *in order that we discover* the truth about the natures of things we must look at instances of them; we must have some sense experience of them. But the natures of things do not depend upon our discovery of them, and likewise the truth about their natures does not depend upon there being any individuals with those natures. Their existence depends upon God's freely creating them. Their possibility depends upon their being possible participations or copies of God's nature,[39] and God knows these diverse natures quite apart from whether He creates them or not. So as regards our means of knowing, St. Thomas is Aristotelian; as regards the ontological status of what we know, he tends in this particular case toward Platonism—or better still, he improves and corrects Platonism in his own Thomism.

III

It will no doubt have been remarked that we have been using our second basic distinction—between what is asserted and how we find it out—in our discussion of the first distinction. The fact is that the one involves the other, especially for human knowledge, where it is not possible to know the natures or properties of things without first seeing examples or instances of those things. Evidently, then, we are proposing the direct opposite to the Berkeleian thesis that *esse est percipi*, a thesis which has merely to be stated in order to be seen to

be false. Berkeley missed the distinction between a thing's existence and our knowledge of its existence, or he put it so clumsily that it has been confused by his followers.

IV

It is instructive to notice the differences of opinion among Scholastic logicians about the existential import of *I* propositions. The general opinion, voiced by Coffey and Dopp, is that they are existential. So Coffey says, "Particular propositions, whether affirmative or negative, almost invariably carry with them, in ordinary usage, if no implication, at least an assumption, of the existence of their subjects."[40] Dopp says, "Particular judgements are generally interpreted as being existential. 'Some man is vain' signifies in effect : 'There is at least one supposit which is at the same time man and vain.' "[41] The quotation from Siger given above leaves no doubt that he would agree with this assertion. Yet Maritain thinks otherwise. He offers some examples of propositions which he says are *I* propositions and yet nonexistential. They are "Some man is creable" and "Some animal (viz. man) is rational."[42]

The first proposition looks strange from the outset. If it means "There exist men who are creable," it certainly is existential; but if it means "It is possible for there to be a man who is creable," then it is no longer categorical. It is modal. As we suggested before, a mere transference of necessary propositions over to modal logic would solve this whole problem. The second proposition means either "There exists at least one individual animal" (and then it is existential) or "The class *animal* contains the class *rational*" (and then it is not an *I* proposition). *I* propositions concern individuals which are members of both *S* and *P*. So our second interpretation, if true, prevents it from being an *I* proposition.

We might further note that the same objection as we have raised

[40] *Science of Logic*, p. 260.

[41] "Les jugements particuliers sont généralement interprétés comme étant existentiels. 'Quelque homme est vaniteux' signifie en effet: 'Il y a au moins un suppôt qui est à la fois homme et vaniteux' " (*Leçons de logique formelle*, p. 91).

[42] *Introduction to Logic*, p. 227.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 229.

[44] Cf. n. 17 of the article mentioned in n. 2 above.

[45] Cf. S. Thomas, *ST* I, q. 13, aa. 5 & 12.

against Maritain's interpretation of the second proposition above applies also to this third proposition, which he takes as being both *I* and nonexistential; namely, "Some man (for instance, a saint) has imperfections." [43]

The question of the status of propositions in natural science does not affect the question here. They are generally interpreted as being probability-statements; so they are half way, as it were, between contingent and necessary statements—contingent insofar as they make assertions about past instances, tending towards necessity insofar as they tend toward assertions about all possible instances. One could say that they start from the contingent and progress towards the necessary, the necessary proposition being the *limit* of a progression which is infinite. So, since they never reach their limit, presumably they remain existential.

As we have said before,[44] there is one type of necessary proposition which has existential import; namely, any statement about the nature of God. Such propositions, however, cannot strictly be called *A* propositions because God is neither a category of being nor subsumed under a category. Nor can they strictly be called *I* propositions, because God is not a member of a species, or even singular propositions, if the subject of a singular proposition is taken to be a member of a species. By abstracting from the limitations of being involved in the use of these types of proposition, though, we can use them in a wider sense to refer to the Being who possesses *eminentiori modo* whatever perfections of being exist within the categories.[45] Evidently we are not called upon here to go into such a vast subject.

V

There are two unstated axioms for the Aristotelian Square. One is that no self-contradictory term can function as value for the variables *S* and *P*. The other, the one we have been concerned with throughout this paper, is that there are *actual instances* of *S* and *P*, whatever species or genus *S* and *P* might stand for. It is this second axiom which involves the essential eternity of the world, thereby rendering it incompatible with any creationist metaphysics and therefore with Thomist thought.

Nevertheless, a very small change suffices to get us out of the

impasse. If this second axiom were to demand only the *possibility* of instances of S and P, the Square would then be satisfactory. In fact, since self-contradictions are not allowed as terms in the Square, it could be said that this axiom of possible instances is already present in the first axiom.

On this interpretation, the essential proposition would figure in a *modal* Square, as an A or an E. A would read, "Every S is necessarily P"; and E, "Every S is necessarily non-P." I would mean, "It is possible for an individual to exist which was S and P"; and O, "It is possible for an individual to exist which was S and non-P." This, then, is the Square for the necessary or scientific proposition; and it is nonexistential. The ordinary existential categorical Square can then be kept for the enumerative A's and E's, these propositions being only magnified I's and O's.

VI

In conclusion we would like to quote, from the Polish logician Czezowski, a passage on Aristotelian logic which is a model of clarity and succinctness:

> In order to make it precise we place in front of the classical logic the axiom:
>
> 422.1 (S) (Ex)Sx.
>
> that is, for every predicator S there exists an x such that x is S.
>
> This axiom expresses in logical language the metaphysical principle fundamental to the Aristotelian theory of science

[46]T. Czezowski, *Logika* (Warsaw: PZWS, 1949), pp. 106-7. (Our translation).

Explanation: A predicator, designated by letters such as P, Q, R, S, could be defined as:

$$(f):(EP).fx = Px \text{ Df.}$$

Czezowski defines Z and U as:

$$\text{'}Zx\text{'} = \text{'}KPxNPx\text{'} \text{ Df.}$$

$$\text{'}Ux\text{'} = \text{'}APxNPx\text{'} \text{ Df.}$$

(*ibid.*, p. 99).

[47]Czezowski is not the only one to propose such an exclusion. Cf. T. Kotarbinski, *Elementy teorji poznania, logiki formalnej i metodologji nauk* [Elements of the theory of knowledge, formal logic, and methodology of the sciences] (Lwow, 1929), pp. 222-25. Cf. also, J. Salamucha, *Pojecie Dedukcji u Arystotelesa i sw. Tomasza z Akwinu* [The notion of deduction in Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas] (Warszawa, 1930), p. 122. Here we find the following: "Mathematical logic is a logic of deduction, formally quite different from the logic of Aristotle. The entire formal logic of Aristotle could become a small part of mathematical logic if it were supplemented by certain additional assumptions. Thus, for instance, a rule should be introduced forbidding the substitution of the so-called 'null or empty names' and such universal names which comprise the designata of all names, e. g., the name 'object' for name-variables." (Our translation.)

according to which forms, genera and species (S) exist only in individual object (x). It excludes Z as a term in any proposition whatsoever: it excludes also U since the range of the variable S extends to the negation of predicators. Thus if we were to introduce U we would have to introduce the zero predicator NU contrary to the axiom. Axiom 422.1 performs an essential function. For if we remove the restriction imposed by that axiom, universal propositions become ambiguous, and some theorems in classical logic—false.[46]

For the reasons already given, we propose the replacement of the axiom of the *existence* of x's by that of their *possibility*. Czezowski's exclusion of the null and universal classes from Aristotelian logic prevents the occurrence of all those types of paradoxical inference mentioned in "Is the Square Back in Opposition?"[47]

A New Journal "of sacred and profane studies" has been begun by Editorial Herder of Barcelona. Entitled *Orbis Catholicus*, its more proximate function is indicated by its subtitle, "Revista Ibercamericana Internacional." Its intention is to provide for the Spanish-speaking peoples a continuing contact with the contemporary intellectual and cultural movements, especially of Europe. Listed as collaborators are about a hundred of the better-known Catholic scholars in Europe and South America. In the first issue, there are articles by Hans Urs von Balthasar ("La palabra en la historia"), E. Beitia ("Raíz modernista de la religión en Unamuno"), Jacques Leclerq ("El cristiano ante el orden internacional"), and M.-F. Sciacca ("Humanismo y palabra revelada"). A section is devoted to analyses of various movements, and there are a few book reviews. Subscriptions can be obtained through Herder and Herder, Inc. (7 West 46th St., New York 36) at 75¢ a copy, $4.80 a year.

Research Difficulties in the *Liber De Causis*

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In a recent article on Gabriel Marcel, James Collins suggests that acquiring an exact understanding of this French existentialist is difficult because of the nature of his writings. Some, it is true, are cast as technical lectures (for example, his "Gifford Lectures," *The Mystery of Being*), but many others are either plays or journals. "As a practical footnote," Dr. Collins concludes, "it may be added that Marcel's writings are somewhat diffuse. Hence a real service would be performed by a concise selection of his leading doctrines in a single volume." [1]

In the present study we are concerned with an early medieval Semitic author, who obviously is widely separated from Marcel in time, nationality, background, and the like, and yet who is similar to the French author on this one point: he too is hard to follow precisely because of the nature of his treatise. No matter what doctrine one seeks to investigate in his *Liber de Causis*, one encounters several textual obstacles which impede that investigation and which we intend here to isolate so as to make future research in the *Liber* easier.

But before engineering the isolation, can we identify that medieval author more closely? Not with any certainty, for although its Latin translation is commonly attributed to Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187), the authorship itself of the *Liber* is still an open question. According to G. Anawati's recent and detailed survey, most modern scholars have attributed it either to Alfarabi, who died at Baghdad in 950 A.D., or to David the Jew, who worked together with Gundissalinus in Toledo, Spain, on translating Arabic and Greek treatises into Latin during the second half of the twelfth century and whose name variously appears as Ibn David, Abraham Ibn Daoud, Avendauth, Avendehut, Avendehat, and so on.[2] According to Anawati himself, its authorship cannot yet be definitively decided; but he would seem to favor a ninth-century Arab as its author, and he certainly counsels attentive study of Arabian Neoplatonists and, among the Greeks, of Plotinus as well as of Proclus before one decides the question.[3]

Incidentally, Father Anawati's suggestion that Plotinus may have directly influenced the author of the *Liber* is corroborated by a recently discovered similarity between their accounts of how the universe was caused. The

Greek author divides the genesis of the universe into two atemporal moments—the overflowing of the cause and, secondly, the self-completion of that which has overflowed by turning back *to contemplate* its cause. The author of the *Liber* has retained Plotinus's second moment in all important essentials and has simply substituted creation for the first moment. The First Cause no longer produces by overflowing: He creates, He gives being to the Intelligence (or whatever the item in question may be). That Intelligence then proceeds to develop itself by receiving *through contemplation* the additional perfections God pours upon it. In stressing the function which *contemplation* performs in that moment of self-completion, our author seems much closer to Plotinus than to Proclus.[4]

Now back to our aim in the present paper. What main textual difficulties await the student of the *Liber de Causis*?[5]

[1]"Marcel: Christian Socratic," *Commonweal*, LXVIII, No. 22 (Aug. 29, 1958), 542.

[2]G. C. Anawati, O.P., "Prolégomènes à une nouvelle édition du *De Causis* arabe," *Mélanges L. Massignon* (Paris: A. Maisonneuve, 1957), pp. 73-110.

[3]*Ibid.*, pp. 83-5, 109-110.

[4]See L. Sweeney, S.J., "The Doctrine of Creation in the *Liber de Causis*," Etienne Gilson testimonial volume (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1959).

[5]The text used is R. Steele, *Liber de Causis*, Vol. XII of *Opera Hactenus Inedita Rogeri Baconi* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), pp. 161-87. References will be to Propositions, in arabic numbers to pages and lines. For instance, "IV, 164, 11" means Steele's edition, Proposition Four, page 164, line 11.

Otto Bardenhewer's German translation of the Arabic text (*Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift Ueber das reine Gute bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de Causis* [Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1882], pp. 58-118) will also be constantly consulted and will complement Steele's edition wherever necessary or helpful. References to that German translation will be made in the same manner as to this latter, except for the addition of "B (G)." For example, "B (G), IV, 65, 9" should be read as Bardenhewer's German translation, Proposition Four, page 65, line 9.

[6]St. Thomas seems first to have recognized our author's dependency upon Proclus's treatise, after reading William of Moerbeke's translation (see H. D. Saffrey, *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Super Librum de Causis Expositio* [Fribourg: Société Philosophique; Louvain: Éditions E. Nauwelaerts, 1954], p. xxiv and p. 3, l. 7 sq.). An edition of William's translation has recently been published by C. Vansteenkiste, O.P., "Procli Elementatio Theologica Translata a Guilelmo de Moerbeke (Textus Ineditus)," *Tijdschrift voor Phil.*, XIII (1951), 263-302 and 490-531.

[7]E. R. Dodds (ed.), *Proclus: Elements of Theology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933 [hereafter referred to as Dodds]), Prop. 88, p. 80, l. 25 sq.

[8]II, 162, 23 sq.

[9]This indication is located in the fact that, whereas the Being which is prior to Eternity is *being*, the One is not *being* at all. Why? Because the One is prior to Being as well as to all else (e.g., Dodds, Prop. 2, p. 4, l. 19 sq.; Prop. 115, p. 100, l. 28 sq.; etc.)

[10]II, 162, lines 26 sq., 32 sq. and 35 sq.

[11]Dodds, p. 246.

[12]II, 162, 27 sq. For Proclus's conception of time in the *Elements*, see Dodds, Props. 53-55, p. 50 sq. and pp. 228-230.

[13]For a discussion of its relationship with the *Elements of Theology*, as well as a list of the propositions from Proclus which each proposition in the *Liber* is based upon, see Bardenhewer, pp. 11-37.

The first such obstacle is easily recognized—the disconcerting way in which its author uses Proclus's *Elements of Theology*.[6] If he merely repeated or even wholly rejected the pagan Greek, one might easily conclude that his attitude toward problems is or is not essentially Procline. What he actually does, however, is much more complex and subtle. He paraphrases or, at times, even literally quotes Proclus; but then he inserts his own qualifying phrases and clauses within those very paraphrases and quotations, or even replaces portions with his own statements.

Let us take as a representative case his comparatively short and simple Proposition II, where he locates the First Cause, Intelligence, and Soul with reference to eternity. In Proposition 88 of his *Elements*, Proclus states that "every true Being is either prior to Eternity or in Eternity or is a participant of Eternity."[7] In Proposition II of the *Liber de Causis*, however, that statement becomes: *Omne esse superius aut est superius eternitate et ante ipsam aut est cum eternitate aut est post eternitatem et supra tempus*.[8] In his explanation of Proposition 88, Proclus indicates with sufficient clarity that the Being prior to Eternity is not the One *seu* First Cause but is the First Being.[9] According to the *Liber*, though, the Being prior to Eternity is the First Cause, which holds that rank, as our author emphatically repeats, precisely because it has caused eternity, which therefrom has acquired its being.

> Esse vero quod est ante eternitatem est causa prima, quoniam est causa ei. . . . Et significatio quod causa prima est ante eternitatem ipsam, est quod esse in ipsa est acquisitum . . . Et causa prima est supra eternitatem, quoniam eternitas est causatum ipsius.[10]

In Proclus's Proposition 88, the Being which is in eternity is the First Life, whereas the Being which is a participant of Eternity is the Intelligence.[11] In Proposition II of the *Liber*, nonetheless, the Being which is with, and in, eternity has become the Intelligence, while the Being which is after Eternity and above Time is the Soul, a position which this latter holds precisely because it is the cause of time (*et anima . . . est supra tempus quoniam est causa temporis*).[12]

Almost every proposition in the *Liber* exemplifies that disconcerting use its author makes of the pagan Greek philosopher.[13] But our brief analysis of Proposition II is sufficient to indicate that certainly one obstacle standing in the way of an easy and accurate evaluation of his position on any problem is the fact that our author is both so near and yet so far from Proclus.

The next obstacle is perhaps less obvious but equally formidable—our anonymous author attempts too much in too little space. In R. Steele's edition, the *Liber* runs to only twenty-six pages,[14] yet within that relatively small area an entire and complex universe is unfolded. At its summit is the First Cause; at its base is the sensible universe; and on the two intervening levels are souls and intelligences.[15] Each stratum of creatures is again subdivided hierarchically. The lowest is headed by heavenly bodies and Time, with material things filling in the lower ranks.[16] On the next stratum the higher division is made up of intellectual souls, with the First Intellectual Soul occupying the lead position, and the lower division is constituted by mere souls (*ex animabus est que est anima intelligibilis . . . et ex eis est que est anima tantum*).[17] On the third stratum divine intelligences make up the more perfect rank, which is headed by the First Divine Intelligence, and mere intelligences form the less perfect (*ex intelligentiis est que est intelligentia divina . . . et de eis est que est intelligentia tantum*).[18]

Moreover, within those same few pages our author is not content merely to sketch the general structure of that hierarchy but also aims at disclosing

[14]Pp.161-87.

[15]The four levels of the universe are implied in almost every Proposition. As examples of more explicit passages, see IV, 164, 3 sq.; IX, 169, 2 sq.

[16]Propositions XXX to XXXII, pp. 183-87, *passim*. What we here call "material things" are variously described in the *Liber*: bodies involved in magnitude, motion, and division (VII, 167, 2 sq.); *generata* (IX, 169, 22); *res destructibiles* (XI, 171, 19); *res sensibiles que moventur* (XIV, 172, 29); *corpora naturalia*, which can be either inanimate or rational (XIX, 176, 16 sq. and 31 sq.) *substantie . . . composite cadentes sub generatione . . . res temporales* (XXIX, 183, 14 sq.).

[17]XIX, 176, 14 sq.

[18]*Ibid.*, line 12 sq.

[19]XXX, 183, 25 sq.

[20]VIII, 168, 1 sq.; XIV, 172, 25 sq

[21]XII, 171, 23 sq.

[22]I, 161, 1 sq.

[23]XXII, 178, 24 sq.

[24]"Et virtus quidem divina est supra omnem virtutem . . . quoniam est causa omni virtuti" (X, 170, 21 sq.; IX, 170, 2 sq.). "Causa prima est fixa, stans cum unitate sua pura semper" (XX, 177, 6 sq.). Also see IV, 164, 5 sq.

[25]"Immo est unitas ejus [First Cause] pura, quoniam est simplex in fine simplicitatis" (IV, 164, 5 sq.; XXI, 178, 8 sq.).

[26]"Natura continet generationem, et anima continet naturam, et intelligentia continet animam. . . Et causa quidem prima . . . est supra intelligentiam et animam et naturam" (IX, 169, 24 sq.). Because of its transcendence, the First Cause is also above knowledge and description (VI, 166, 1 sq; XXII, 178, 21 sq.).

[27]IV, 164, 3 and 21. Our author repeatedly affirms that the first creature is the Intelligence *seu* Being. For instance, "Et intelligentia . . . est primum creatum quod creatum est a causa prima" (VII, 167, 25 sq.); "ens autem creatum primum, scilicet intelligentia" (XVI, 174, 19 sq.); *ibid.*, l. 33 sq.; XXIII, 179, 12.

Hence, in IV, 164, 3, what our author meant to say is, most likely, that the First Created Being is above every *lower* intelligence ("supra [inferiorem] intelligentiam").

Perhaps, though, the problem cannot

the mutual relationships between its various levels and, even, between various items within one and the same level. A whole list of such disclosures can easily be drawn up. For instance, the higher is joined to the lower through a middle item, which is similar to each extreme.[19] The higher knows the lower as its effect, while the lower knows the higher as its cause.[20] The higher is in the lower, and the lower in the higher, each in its own way.[21] In the case of an effect produced by both a higher and a lower cause, the higher has more influence than the lower because the higher causes the very causality of the lower, with the result that the efficacy of the Supreme Cause is prior to, present within, and remains after, the efficacy of all other causes.[22] No matter what the basis of comparison may be, the higher is always better than the lower, with the highest completely transcending the order in question. Especially this last point in its many applications reveals the deep layer of Neoplatonism underlying the *Liber*. For example, the higher is more perfect than the lower, while the First Cause is more-than-perfect (*est supra completum*).[23] Again, higher entities are also more powerful and are fewer in number, whereas the First Being is above power and is absolutely unique.[24] What is higher in the scale of reality is also more simple and has more unity, but God *is* absolute simplicity and unity.[25] Again, the higher contains the lower, and what is highest is totally uncontained, for does not Nature contain individual material things, the Soul contain Nature, and the Intelligence contain the Soul, whereas the First Cause is above all?[26]

Such, then, is the hierarchic universe which the author of the *Liber* endeavors to describe within the brief space of its thirty-two propositions —a complex structure whose four tiers are tightly fitted one upon another through mutual resemblance, knowledge, in-existence, and causal influence. Although the testimony he there gives to the existence and nature of an early mediaeval Neoplatonism is extremely valuable and interesting, still one can hardly avoid suspecting that by attempting so much within such narrow textual confines our author may have omitted much relevant and even necessary information on other facets of his doctrine.

Inconsistencies

Although the previous obstacle arises from what the author fails to say, the final set of difficulties is the apparent inconsistencies in what he actually does say. Some of these seem due merely to a defective condition in the text or to a momentary slip of the author's or translator's pen. Such might be the explanation for the contradictory affirmations in IV that the First created Being is above intelligence and yet is intelligence (*esse est . . .*

supra intelligentiam . . . et esse quidem creatum primum est intelligentia).[27] Or, again, in XVI that the First Cause is subsistent Infinity and yet is above it (*Ens autem primum creans est infinitum primum purum . . . proculdubio est supra infinitum*).[28]

be so easily solved since Proclus, too, is caught in a similar inconsistency. At times the Being is *above* intelligence because Being is an intelligible (νοητόν) and prior to *Nous* (Dodds, Prop. 161, p. 140, 14 sq.). More commonly, however, Being and Intelligence are identical (e.g., Dodds, Prop. 20, p. 22 l. 1 sq.; Prop. 129, p. 114, l. 16 sq.; etc.).

[28]XVI, 174, 14 sq. and 19.

Subsistent Infinity is the hub of another puzzle. Infinity comes between the First Cause and the First created Being *seu* Intelligence (XVI, 174, 27 sq.) and, hence, is not to be identified with either. Yet Intelligence is the first creature. What, then, is Infinity? Our author implies that it is caused—"infinitum est a causa prima" (XVI, 174, 31) or "die Unendlichkeit stammt aus der ersten Ursache" (B [G], XV, 90, 4). Yet if caused and prior to Intelligence, why is not Infinity the first creature? If uncaused, why is it not identical with God?

[29]XI, 171, 19 sq. The German version is even clearer—"Die vergänglichen, unter das Entstehen und Vergehen fallenden Dinge sind aus einer Körperlichkeit, ich meine aus einer körperlichen, zeitlichen Ursache" (B [G], X, 82, 2 sq.).

[30]XVI, 174, 32 sq. Also VIII, 168, 1 sq.: Intelligence knows lower items (which include *res corporee*) precisely because it is their cause.

[31]XIX, 176, 14 sq.

[32]III, 163, 7 sq.

[33]*Ibid.*, line 17 sq. Even more clearly: II, 162, 26 sq.; IV, 164, 3 sq.

[34]XII, 171, 24 sq.; XVIII, 175, 20 sq. This latter triad can rather easily be reconciled with the former (see preceding note) if *Vita* is equivalent to *Anima* (as the author himself implies in, for example, XII, 172, 2 sq.) and moved to the third and lowest place.

[35]XV, 173, 33 sq. Also see Props. XXV to XXIX, where various properties are ascribed to such self-sufficient substances. For example, they are above generation (XXV, 181, 1 sq.) and above corruption (XXVI, 181, 19 sq.). They are simple, eternal, and indivisible (XXVII, 182, 9 sq.; XXVIII, 182, 18 sq.). They are more perfect than temporal things (XXIX, 183, 9 sq.).

[36]XXI, 178, 18 q.

[37]"Individuum suum est bonitas pura" (IX, 170, 9 sq.). "Ihr eigenthümliches Wesen ist das reine Gute" (B [G], VIII, 79, 4 sq.).

"Non est bonitas nisi per suum esse et suum ens et suam virtutem, ita quod est bonitas, et bonitas et virtus et ens sunt res una" (XX, 177, 14 sq.). "Propinque uni puro vero" (X, 170, 29 sq.). "Illud ergo in quo est unitas fixa . . . unum primum verum" (XXX, 186, 32 sq.). See also XVII, 175, 4.

[38]See XVI, 174, 14 sq., where *ens primum creans* occurs three times and *ens primum*, twice. In XVIII, 175, 20, *ens primum* occurs three times; in XXX, 186, 19, we find *ens purum*. See IV, 164, 7 sq.; "Propter suam propinquitatem esse puro et uni vero."

[39]XX, 177, 24 sq. and 30 sq. See B (G), XIX, 96, 12 sq.: "Gibt es kein Verhältniss (σχέσις) und nichts anderes Vermittelndes." Then: "So wirkt das Wirkende in Wahrheit und lenkt und leitet in Wahrheit" (*ibid.*, 97, 6 sq.). Also see *ibid.*, p. 198.

[40]"Causa prima creavit esse anime mediante intelligentia" (III, 163, 18 sq.). "Creans animam et naturam et reliquas res mediante intelligentia" (IX, 169, 32).

[41]IX, 169, 1 sq. and 31 sq. That the first creature is, in fact, Intelligence, see the texts gathered *supra*, n. 27, first paragraph.

[42]"Si invenitur res non indigens in generatione sui, id est in sua forma et sua formatione, re alia nisi se, et est ipsa causa formationis sue et sui complementi . . ." (XXV, 181, 11 sq.). Also see XXVI, 181, 31 sq.

[43]Such reconciliation has been attempted in L. Sweeney, S.J., "Doctrine of Creation in the *Liber de Causis*," *passim*.

Others, however, are less easily handled, as the following instances show According to XI, material things are not caused by intelligences but by a corporeal and temporal item (*res destructibiles sunt ex corporeitate, scilicet ex causa corporea temporali, non ex causa intellectuali eterna*),[29] yet according to XVI the First Intelligence is the very medium through which even corporeal things receive life, light, and other perfections (*relique bonitates . . . descendunt super reliqua causata intelligibilia et corporea mediante intelligentia*).[30] Again, in XIX our author classifies the highest type of souls not as divine but as intellectual,[31] and yet in III he attributes to them divine activity.[32] In this latter proposition, also, he lists Being, Intelligence, and Soul as the three top items of his hierarchy;[33] and yet elsewhere he lists Being, Life, and Intelligence.[34] In XV self-sufficiency and independence (*stans fixa per se, non indigens in sui fixione et sui essentia re alia exigente ipsam, quoniam est substantia simplex sufficiens per seipsam*) are somehow predicated of every existent capable of self-knowledge and self-introversion (a description which certainly fits all intelligences);[35] yet in XXI such properties seem restricted entirely to the First Cause because of His absolute simplicity and excluded from all else as absolutely needing the enriching out-pouring of God (*relique autem res intelligibiles aut corporee sunt non divites per seipsas, immo indigent uno vero influente super eas bonitates et omnes gratias*).[36] Frequently he designates his First Principle by such typically Neoplatonic descriptions as "Pure Goodness" or "the Primal One-True,"[37] but occasionally names it simply "First Being," "Pure Being," and the like.[38] Although XX affirms that between a true agent and his effects no mediator exists (*non est continuator neque res alia media . . . agens vero inter quod et inter factum ejus non est continuator penitus, est agens verum et regens verum*),[39] the First Cause is frequently described as creating the Soul and all else through the Intelligence.[40] Finally, God causes all intelligences,[41] which, however, somehow cause themselves through knowledge and, actually, are called "self-constituting" and the like.[42]

According to such instances, our author has made puzzling statements concerning items on every level of his Neoplatonic universe. And although most are reconcilable,[43] still their mere presence is enough to make one's journey through the *Liber* slow and painstaking.

Summary

Such, then, are some reasons why the *Liber de Causis* is by nature difficult to interpret—its author is so near and yet so far from Proclus; he attempts so much in such a few pages; and, finally, he appears to speak

inconsistently. In this brief study our aim has been to render research in this important document easier and less disconcerting by pinpointing in advance these three major obstacles which anyone wishing to successfully locate its author's position on a major topic must conquer. To be forewarned is, so the saying goes, to be forearmed.

LEONARD A. WATERS, S.J., *Creighton University*

Painting and Reality. **By Etienne Gilson. The "A. W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts," 1955. Pantheon Books, 1957. Pp. xxiv + 367.**

This is a very positive as well as a very humble book and one that reflects great credit upon modern Scholasticism. M. Gilson surely deserves our warmest congratulations.

"What has the philosopher to learn from painting?" (p. ix) is the basic attitude of these lectures, and there is nothing at all hypocritical in Professor Gilson's discipleship throughout the book. There is, likewise, nothing apologetic in Gilson's subjection of painting as "reality" to the metaphysics of Aristotle and St. Thomas. Very correctly, then, the book may be described as "the meeting point of two entirely different disciplines: metaphysics and the concrete reality of the painted works of art" (p. x).

Allowing the painters (especially the moderns) to speak of their art, Gilson interprets their doctrine in the light of the classical metaphysics of being and with such sympathy as, equivalently, to bring that philosophy powerfully to the support of painting during the last hundred years, the years of "the boldest creative experiment ever attempted during the whole evolution of the art of painting" (p. x). The result is quite exhilarating. No one could put Aristotle and St. Thomas quite so rigidly to the test of modernity as modern painters; and, conversely, modern painting has received new depth and stature from its association here with the wisdom of the ages.

The first half of the book is devoted to separate chapters (lectures) on the existence, individuality, duration, ontology, and causality of paintings as Aristotle understood those concepts. The arrangement is a bit untidy but the conclusions are uniformly clear and fresh. A painting is—has physical as well as aesthetic existence—in genuine independence of the beings existing in nature. This solid basis of realism, rigidly distinct from Kantian idealism or any abstractive "mentalism," gives worth and dignity to the whole artistic activity. "Still-life" painting, for example, is taken as a kind of archetype in that it can rightly be said to have no "subject" if by subject we mean the description of some scene or some action:

> . . . the things that a still life represents exercise only one single

> act, but it is the simplest and most primitive of all acts, namely, TO BE. . . . Always present to that which is, this act of being usually lies hidden, and unrevealed, behind what the thing signifies, says, does, or makes (p. 28).

With this sharp distinction between "subject" and "painting" the author allows the painters to insist upon the aesthetic activity as the very substance of their art. Realist, again, matter and form are defended by Gilson as principles truly constitutive of any art piece and not merely metaphorically. A strictly Aristotelian concept of form is vindicated for a painting. It is "the essential nature of a thing" (p. 110). It "isolates within matter a whole that because it is endowed with determinate size, shape, and position in space is capable of separate existence" (p. 111). Thus art is "the ability to create a new being that nobody would ever see, either in nature or otherwise, unless the art of the painter caused it to exist" (p. 116). "The artist creates a form; and by the same token, a being" (p. 123).

This establishes in Scholastic realism the fact of the artist as creator. From here on, the dialogue of the book is pretty much concerned with this concept of creation as opposed to "imitation" and with its realistic meaning and implications. Since a painter creates a form, all his obligations are to the very form he creates and not to any external object, being, or landscape that he might try to imitate. So,

> . . . a true painter does not borrow his subject from reality; he does not even content himself with arranging the material provided by reality so as to make it acceptable to the eye. His starting point is fantasy, imagination, fiction, and all the elements of reality that do not agree with the creature imagined by the painter have to be ruthlessly eliminated (p. 130).

At the heart of the creative process, then, we find not natural "subjects" to be copied, but "motifs," "incentives to create"; that is, "the response of the imagination of an artist to the stimuli of sense perceptions" (p. 138). In this way the foundation for nonrepresentational art is laid. Idealism fails to provide a solid basis for art, which is really a distinct order of being neither absolutely severed from nature nor identified with nature but one created by beings of nature—artists.

Is the precise origin of the creative process, then, to be called "intuition"? Gilson doubts if this is the best word (p. 150), since he is afraid intuition may connote a "vision," the perfect precognition of a work to be done. Nevertheless, "the starting point of the painter—that is, what he first has in mind—is a more or less fluid image, or rather a sort of moving scheme that is much less a model properly so-called than the germ of the work to be" (p. 149). This is an intellectual activity, of course, but not a

vision, and, as knowledge, little resembles the determinate knowledge we have of already existing objects.

> The germinal form in the mind of the painter is not such a [mathematical] law, but it operates in accordance with a secret feeling for intelligibility. A sort of instinct rather than a knowledge, the germinal form gropes its way toward its final embodiment in a certain matter according to an inner tendency similar to that which orientates the form toward its end in the production of a natural being (p. 187).

These reflections on intuition inevitably recall Professor Jacques Maritain and the volume which is companion to this in the "Mellon Lectures," *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry*. Maritain is mentioned only very sparingly in this book; and from the objections Gilson makes to his key ideas of "poetry" and "intuition," it might seem as if the present work is designed as a correction of Maritain. Such would, however, be a totally superficial view. The two books come out of precisely the same metaphysical roots in St. Thomas and Aristotle, and show the same kind of radical application of philosophy to art. It is rather, I believe, that Gilson's approach is more soberly ontological and Maritain's frankly exploratory in the psychological wastes of the unconscious and preconscious. It is true that "mentalism" (if Maritain ever held it) here receives very positive correction. But "intuition," while Gilson does not explore its psychological roots, and even "poetry" (though the term itself is not accepted in Maritain's sense) are certainly assumed in the "germinal form," the "motif," the "instinct," by which hand and mind co-operate in painting and without which there would be in painting no "poetry," "music," "painting"—but only subjects to be represented (p. 252).

The last four chapters are more immediately concerned with the evolution of modern painting in the light of the principles here discussed. The evolution is splendidly defended as the pursuit of pleasure, and pleasure as founded in real beauty. This involves us in the problem of creation as against imitation. Gilson doesn't like either Plato's or Aristotle's doctrine of imitation because the idea of representation, logically leading ultimately to deception, always introduces an antinomy into the doctrine of artistic creation (p. 250-52). "Is not the pleasure given by art independent of the subject?" The whole evolution of painting from 1857 to 1957 is here defended; it is the progressive attempt "to eliminate from painting all the merely representational elements and exclusively to preserve the poetic elements" (p. 252). If, logically, this leads to the elimination of all representation in painting, even representation of geometric forms and purely plastic elements, until finally nothing is left but "prime matter"

itself as "subject" of paintings, Gilson is willing to go the whole way, commenting only, in a dry way, "The only objection to prime matter is that it is rather monotonous" (p. 257).

A distinction very important in religious art is thus introduced: the distinction between painting and "picturing." The ultimate object of a painting is "to achieve a fitting object of contemplation" which may or may not be representational (p. 266). But picturing is the art of representing or imitating. Thus, for religious worship or historical commemoration, a *picture* may be required which will, by representing or imitating some object not present, fulfil the need of piety or education. A *painting* in the same situation, because it may be nonrepresentational, may totally fail to give satisfaction. Nevertheless, "the art of doing Christian pictures does not exclude the possibility of doing Christian paintings; by itself, however, it necessarily is representational art" (p. 295). Would that church artists accepted this distinction.

In defense of nonrepresentational art, Gilson is much more tolerant than was Maritain. He seems not to be afraid of the "animal frenzy" and cynical abandonment of beauty for ugliness which can be the motive for suppression of natural appearances. He approaches a "qualitative universe" (pp. 269-80) distinct from the visible universe in the inexhaustible realm of possible reality. To disclose this world "either real for us to discover or possible for art to actualize" (p. 280) is the proper function of creative art. It is his metaphysics which keeps Professor Gilson here free both from idealism and from a surrealist craving to violate reality in a mad attempt to discover truth beyond human reason. It may not always keep the artists themselves free from such madness. The greatest gift within the power of realism to offer the painter, if he will only accept it, is this contact with being which makes him truly a "creator," and at a still higher level, assures him that

> . . . he will know the exhilarating feeling of finding himself in contact with the closest analogue there is, in human experience, to the creative power from which all the beauties of art as well as those of nature ultimately proceed. Its name is Being (p. 299).

With these profound words Professor Gilson brings to a close a truly magnificent book.

LEONARD A. WATERS, S.J., *Creighton University*

Literary Criticism: A Short History. **By William K. Wimsatt, Jr., and Cleanth Brooks. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957. Pp. xv + 755. $6.75 (text), $8.95 (trade).**

Joyce and Aquinas. **By William T. Noon, S.J. "Yale Studies in English," Vol. 133. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. xii + 167. $3.75.**

Problems of Art: Ten Philosophical Lectures. **By Susanne K. Langer. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1957. Pp. 184. $3.50.**

In reviewing Mr. Wimsatt's book, *The Verbal Icon*, we emphasized the author's growing importance among American critics as a spokesman for the Christian-Aristotelian tradition in literature. The present *Short History* is another noteworthy step in Mr. Wimsatt's emergence. In collaboration with Mr. Cleanth Brooks, one of the brilliant "names" in the new criticism and now his associate at Yale, Wimsatt here presents a full-scale review in one volume of the whole of Western literary critical writing from Plato to Maritain and Mrs. Langer. The book is not an anthology, though there is considerable direct quotation, nor is it strictly a history of criticism. It is a series of well-documented but rather chatty essays on the significance for our day of the famous systems of literary criticism of the past; an "argumentative history of literary argument in the West" (vii), if we take the authors' own view. No really new material is uncovered; but the emphasis upon the medieval theorists and the respect shown for Coleridge and the nineteenth-century apologists for romanticism (Coleridge, Wordsworth, Shelley, and Croce are quoted with unusual fullness) are both so uncommon as to be almost "discoveries."

What is worthy of highest praise here is that the authors do argue for a single point of view (broadly Aristotelian) and vigorously maintain that there are absolute objective values and norms in literature. Thus, the theme for the whole work is found in the original Platonic-Aristotelian dilemma, idealism *vs.* realism. Mingling modern opinions freely with the historical ones under discussion, the authors keep this theme meaningfully alive throughout the book. It may turn into the question of imitation *vs.* intuition in the classical period or the supremacy of didacticism over inspiration in the Middle Ages, but always the choice seems to be Plato or Aristotle. A rather bewildering set of antinomies are all deftly brought back to the court of Aristotle's realism: morality *vs.* license (Sidney), skepticism *vs.* "probabilism" (Dryden), decoration preferred to originality

(eighteenth century), and imagination and individuality revolting against imitation and decorum in the turmoil of the nineteenth century.

Finally, the last two hundred pages survey the warring critical schools of modern times. This is, naturally, the most interesting section of the book; but it is also somewhat disappointing. Brooks is not the Aristotelian that Wimsatt is, and it is Brooks who takes responsibility for this section. Perhaps he is too close to the men and movements in which he has taken a considerable part personally. At any rate, the difficulty seems to be that after five hundred pages of discussion of the realist-idealist dilemmas, the dilemma itself comes to be the reality; one comes subtly to believe that it has no solution. This is basically an abandonment of the authors' original "argument" for Aristotle and absolute values. Thus the Aristotelian criterion is not rigorously applied to Hegel, Jung, the symbolists, I.A. Richards, semanticists, and the rest. Mr. Brooks, for example, cites I.A. Richards's statement that words "lead to the creation of bogus entities, the universals, properties, and so forth" (p. 636) without argument, even though Richards's system thus leads (as is pointed out) to rank exploitation of the emotions. The criterion here applied to the moderns seems to me to be not Aristotle but Brooks's own irony, paradox, and ambiguity—valuable in themselves but not incisive enough in a book of this architecture.

In a discussion involving Aristotle, finally, it is a fault that the true nature of the hylomorphic principles of being and action is not driven home with emphasis. Matter and form are not clearly expounded as *principia entis* (for example, "The *to ti ēn einai*—the "being what a thing was"—is a relative of *ousia* so close as to be nearly indistinguishable from it" [p. 23]). No vigorous application of Aristotelian "form" is possible unless the analogy of being is "stressed, instressed." These critics are in the forefront of a new humanistic interpretation of literature, and this book is to be praised highly even while a stronger metaphysical base is recommended.

Father William T. Noon, S.J., one of M. Wimsatt's graduate students at Yale, here presents his doctoral dissertation, a splendid example of the kind of scholarship Mr. Wimsatt represents and is fostering.

It should be said at once that *Joyce and Aquinas* is primarily a study and interpretation of James Joyce's work and only secondarily an analysis of what can and cannot be drawn from St. Thomas Aquinas in the way of an aesthetic theory. Nevertheless, Father Noon is an excellent metaphysician, and it may be that this exposition of St. Thomas will be the most effective feature of the book.

The argument of the book is, I think, that Joyce's work, as satire and comedy, cannot be correctly appreciated unless one knows the criterion or

milieu or abstract ideal in terms of which everything that Joyce touched is satirized. That criterion, to an astonishing degree, is Joyce's grasp of St. Thomas and the Catholic world-outlook. Obviously, this is an analytic approach which no Joyce scholar can overlook, and Father Noon's command of metaphysics gives his interpretation depth and authority. It is possible that Joyce's irony is overpraised, however. Through irony, any comment, however blasphemous or scandalous, coming from the mouth of Joyce-Bloom-Daedalus-Stephen as a kind of composite hero, can be interpreted as ironic. And when through "ironic incognito" (p. 103) the artist is hidden, how is a reader to judge "that Joyce succeeds in presenting a searching and exhaustive critique of contemporary society" (p. 101)? It is precisely the norm that becomes obscure. The devil himself is a theologian. "Nihilism" would, indeed, be an absurd attitude for St. Thomas, but is Joyce St. Thomas even when he uses Thomas's sublime theology?

Despite this query, the theme of the book is solid and its scholarship outstanding. In successive chapters, Father Noon explores Joyce's knowledge of St. Thomas, his aesthetic theory, his famous "epiphanies" as related to Thomistic metaphor and *claritas*, his development of the genre of comedy with the aid of St. Thomas's view of individual and class, and finally, in very careful dogmatic chapters, the Blessed Trinity and God as Creator, beautifully handled as analogues of the artist-creator and his works as creations of his mind and heart—giving real vitality to Joyce's concern with the gestation of language in his later work. No indication can be given here of the competence with which Father Noon handles St. Thomas's texts which bear on aesthetics. There is not an unscholarly conclusion in the book, and there are many that deal with highly controverted questions in aesthetics.

It is a distinct pleasure to read Mrs. Langer's classically beautiful English prose writing. Full of insights, yet patiently methodical, her pages reveal her intense personality in language that is itself a product of art.

Problems of Art—really a gathering of lectures given since Mrs. Langer's last book, *Feeling and Form* (1953)—does not materially change the author's aesthetic theory. The lecture form is evident throughout, and the book's greatest merit is its clarification and illustration of her position.

The concept of "significant form" or "living form" is still the key to Mrs. Langer's work and is the best thing in it, but it is still plagued with the problem of the relationship of form to "feeling" as the subjective source of art. It does not seem to me that the "significant form" as she presents it must be read as necessarily the product of idealistic philosophy. In fact, it seems to me to call out for a dualism and is more meaningful when explained in terms of analogy (which the author uses) than in any

other context. Thus, the lecture "Living Form" (and those preceding it), which uses the language of analogy, is more effective as an explanation of creation in poetry than the strictly idealistic final lecture, "Poetic Creation." Even in that lecture (p. 150) Mrs. Langer sees that a philosophy of idealism is not essential to her theory of form. Moreover, in idealism the problem is precisely how this artistic form (if it really exists) is related to subjective feeling. Her really splendid analysis of form demands some relationship in being which will explain how a poem is a projection, in any sense, of one's self.

It is interesting that Jacques Maritain (*Creative Intuition*, Chapter 4) also speaks of emotion as the *form* of the poem in much the same context as Mrs. Langer. The meaning, if interpreted in terms of the analogy of being, would seem to be very much the same, and it would give emotion or feeling in Mrs. Langer's theory a solid objective relationship to the form of the poem.

NICHOLAS RESCHER, *Lehigh University*

The Tragic Philosopher: A Study of Friedrich Nietzsche. **By F. A. Lea. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 354. $6.00.**

In his foreword, Lea explains that he means his book to be neither a biography of Nietzsche nor a systematic study of his philosophy; "its principal aim is to trace the *development* of Nietzsche's thought from 1865, the year of his 'conversion' by Schopenhauer, to 1888." It is mildly vexing to the reader that a work which comes so close to being a biography, by the very nature of its subject, has abstained from the relatively minor additions that would constitute the final step. However, within its self-imposed limitations, this is a very fine study indeed. It presents the Odyssey of Nietzsche's thought from its initial dependency on Schopenhauer and Wagner to final bold autonomy and self-sufficiency. This is done well, providing a full sympathetic portraiture of Nietzsche's ideas, supported by ample quotations from his works.

Among the merits of Lea's presentation are his appreciation and sympathy for Nietzsche, which never decline to mere adulation. Lea maintains throughout an attitude of independent evaluation and critical assessment, making an earnest effort to separate the wheat from the chaff. For example, he quite rightly finds in the late Nietzsche a misanthropy that is a travesty on his own earlier clear vision of Apollonian standards of human potentiality.

The reader will, I think, find of particular interest Lea's penetrating critique of Nietzsche's fervently hostile conception of Christianity and of

Jesus. "[Nietzsche's] interpretation of history, and therefore of his own role in history, stands or falls with his representation of Jesus. If he was mistaken in this, he was mistaken in much else as well: and I, for one, believe he was radically mistaken" (p. 335). Nietzsche's invidious identification of Christianity with the stultifying and self-righteous syrup served up by a host of pietistic female relatives who plagued his boyhood in Naumburg precluded his achieving anything approaching a balanced grasp of the meaning of Christianity.

To the reviewer's mind, the most serious outright defect of Lea's book is its oblique treatment of the process of fraud and forgery by which Nietzsche's sister Elizabeth attempted, all too successfully, to modify and distort the image of Nietzsche for posterity. This distortion is only hinted at in a few passing references. It should surely have been accorded fuller, explicit discussion in a book of this sort, which aims to right our view of Nietzsche's personality and work in order to create a more favorable climate for a study of his writings.

Lea's book is a constructive step in providing English-speaking readers with materials for an understanding and just interpretation of Nietzsche's work. As such, the general reader will be appreciative of its merits, since there are far too few sympathetic Nietzsche studies available in English. But in view of present tendencies in English-speaking philosophy, the current professional indifference to Nietzsche is likely to continue for some years. And this indifference is now wholly unmerited and without foundation. While Lea defends Nietzsche (I think successfully) against the charge of being anti-intellectual and *opposed* to reason, it does seem that Nietzsche has little use for reasoning and logical supporting argumentation as an instrument of philosophic method. Apparently his own practicing concept of philosophical discourse is that it must be a perpetual manifesto. Unfortunately it is this impatience with rational methods of inquiry, rather than his high humanism, that earns for Nietzsche his self-awarded title of "firstling of the twentieth century." Nietzsche suffered from a chronic inability to decide whether to be a philosopher or a prophet. (He once even thought of finding somewhere a large building or perhaps an old castle to house himself and the disciples and followers of whose coming he felt certain.) Despite his consistent affirmation of an uncompromisingly high ideal of human excellence, this undermines Nietzsche's claims to be taken seriously by philosophers of the present day, who turn to the literature in order to learn rather than to be edified.

JAMES COLLINS, *Saint Louis University*

On Selfhood and Godhood. **By C. A. Campbell. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. xxxvi + 436. $6.00.**

Now that J. O. Urmson and others are beginning to take a historical, even a nostalgic, view of the past thirty years in British philosophy, a few features of that period are becoming clear. These years did not bring forth a new and permanent general standpoint as successor to traditional empiricism. Furthermore, the labors of this period did not succeed in laying the ghost of idealism, some stubbornly resistant elements of which continued to operate on minds. And in retrospect, the Gifford Lectureship has afforded the public an opportunity, during the years of "the revolution in philosophy," for continuous development of some pre- and apparently post-revolutionary currents in philosophy.

As Gifford lecturer during 1953-54 and 1954-55, Professor Campbell of Glasgow University confesses his "inability to do obeisance to the twin gods of so much recent British philosophy—empiricism and linguisticism." In earlier contributions to *Mind*, he had set forth reasons for holding that language analysis does not bring us to the heart of the matter. In the present lectures he sets out for the heartland itself, the sphere of religious affirmations. His first bold step is to regard his inquiry as a natural theology rather than the more fashionable philosophy of religion and to admit that natural theology is a metaphysical discipline. He asks those who have grown accustomed to using "metaphysics" as a swear-word to make a temperate review of their emotive attitude and, despite its by now venerable status, to consider the consequence of the disappearance of its general theoretical basis. The verifiability principle has changed even more radically in its status than in its content, since it now stands only as one useful methodological postulate and criterion of meaning, not as the unique definition and norm of meaning.

To prepare the way for a theory of God, Campbell first seeks to determine the nature of man. He appropriates from the idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet two cardinal tenets, the theory of judgment and that of self, but introduces his own modifications. Against Price and other analysts, he argues for the presence of a judgmental factor in every cognition. Although remaining vague on the nature of pure sensation as a noncognitive experience indispensable for cognition, he does show that the ultimate subject of judgment is a mind-independent reality, to which various traits are ascribed. The judging activity enables us to recover what William James liked to call the vanishing self. "An apprehend*ing* cannot be *that which* apprehends. What is 'known' cannot be known to the operation of knowing. It can be known only to a subject which, while *engaged in* the

knowing, is not itself *identical with* the knowing." The judging subject is an active and substantival self, since it has experiences which are not identical simply with its own being. Campbell notes that the substantial self can only vanish in a theory of sense data, where the data are isolated from their judgmental context and given independent status.

In the moral order, also, Campbell appeals to the function of judging as support for the irreducible consciousness of obligation, against the reductionist efforts of the linguists. Here, the canon is proposed that "the meaning of the moral ought is its meaning in moral *experience*, which *need* not, and frequently does not, find overt expression in speech or writing." The moral sentence adds the factor of communication and usually the aim of influencing the future actions of others. This purpose is stressed by the hortatory theory of ethical statements, but the author observes that the hortatory element is an addition to the silent judgment itself of moral obligation. Similarly, the emotive-expressive theory fixes upon the emotional aspect normally involved in stating a moral position, but does not notice that the moral experience itself is composite; it includes both a feeling and a determinate judgment as its components. On the crucial question of whether there is a single moral order for all men, the author reinterprets social anthropology to show that variations are compatible with the presence of a common moral principle, say, the promotion of the well-being of the community. This duty still allows great leeway among different human conceptions of what the community is in basic unity, how the agent belongs to it, and what constitutes its proper well-being.

Campbell finds a turning point to religious problems in the implication of basic moral judgment that there is a real moral order somehow present in the nature of things. The precise manner is explored by various religious and metaphysical views of the supreme being. He distinguishes at once between a rational and a suprarational theism, correlated with a literal and a symbolic use of the divine names. Rational theology is depicted as holding that there is a literal identity of meaning between perfections attributed to God and those we experience, saving only the removal of defects from the latter. A test case is found in the attributes of thought and will. They cannot be given a literal significance without importing imperfection into God, since judgment concerns objects not perfectly known, and willing concerns the acquisition of new perfection or the maintenance of being against possible loss of perfection.

In defence of suprarational theism, Campbell adopts the theory of the numinous proposed originally by Rudolf Otto. There is a felt, but not a conceived, identity between certain symbols and the concept of God. These

representations are imperfect but can be applied with objective validity, since they do not depend on personal caprice but express the internal, necessary structure of the human mind. Metaphysical arguments can then be used to show that the affinity of the symbols holds good not only for the idea of God but also for the divine reality. Campbell revises Bradley on the need to suppose the unity of an infinite reality as the ultimate basis for predicating different factors. Together with the moral argument for a personal spiritual presence, this metaphysical approach shows the relevance of the suprarational concept of God to a divine reality whose nature transcends us.

The lectures on God do not fulfill the promise of those on man. Too many complicated issues are treated too hurriedly, starting with the initial contrast between literal and symbolic meaning. The literal position is variously described as holding for identity of meaning, for precision, and for conceivability of the divine nature, without sorting out these different senses. Scant attention is paid to theories of knowing and willing which do not necessarily involve an imperfection and yet which do not make any claim to know the divine nature in itself. The doctrine of objective symbolic predication rests on a Kantian theory of the a-priori structure of the mind, without fully considering the problems and alternatives.

Yet Campbell is proposing a symbolical theology of a unique sort. He agrees with Sertillanges in rejecting an arbitrary subjective kind of symbolism. The symbols are analogical, in virtue of an intrinsic suggestion leading to the thing symbolized. To overcome the objection that we would have to know the divine nature in order to have a symbolic knowledge expressive of both difference and likeness, Campbell replies that the perfection of value, for instance, even as we conceive it in human experience, points beyond itself.

> Our human aspirations after value cannot find absolute fulfilment so long as any imperfection remains in our state. Now this entails that absolute fulfilment is achievable not in any finite mode of being, but only in an infinitude or self-completeness of being that transcends our human condition. In other words, the ideal consummation of "human value" *itself* lies in a state qualitatively different from any conceivable human value.

This theory of pointing and suggesting on the part of finite things is on the trail of a view of causal participation. It is prevented from reaching the latter position, however, by two circumstances connected with Campbell's sources. His reliance upon Bradley's approach to the infinite reality through an analysis of judgment remains within the a-priorist conception of knowledge and leaves out causal considerations. And his

only cited reference for what he calls the Scholastic theory of analogy is Mascall, who tries to work it out solely in terms of Cajetan's doctrine on analogy of attribution and proportionality. Again, the role of causal inference is neglected in such a notion of analogy, so that the only alternatives before the author are a claim to reach the divine nature somehow in itself and a basing of objective validity upon the necessary structures of the mind. The role of causal inference would be precisely to furnish a primary sort of analogy which would avoid these extremes.

JOHN J. FITZGERALD, *University of Notre Dame*

Philosophy of Science. The Link between Science and Philosophy. **By Philipp Frank. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1957. Pp. xxii + 394.**

In *Philosophy of Science*, Philipp Frank brings his long experience and remarkably agile analytical powers to bear upon the problem of finding or reconstructing some verifiable link between philosophy and science. In a deeper sense, he appears in quest of a world view that respects the originalities and powers of modern scientific thought since the Renaissance without ignoring their connections with Greek, Roman, and medieval philosophical thought. One finds in this effort the scattered fruits of a productive career expressed in a language and form calculated to engage every earnest inquirer into the highly involved problematics of the many relations connecting and dividing the humanistic and scientific learnings of the West.

On the assumption that at any given period man's conception of himself in the world is a function of his prevailing view of the physical universe, the author formulates and evaluates the successive decisive concepts of the physical universe accumulated in the historical course of Western thought. Diverse and even incompatible as are these great conceptual schemes in other respects, they are all found to involve the same primitive elements—sense experience and general principles—the linkage between which constitutes for Professor Frank the basic problem of the philosophy of science.

Ancient philosophical and modern scientific thought are represented as differing primarily in their concepts of the general principles with which they describe and interpret the irreducible data of sense experience. For the ancients—in particular for Plato, Aristotle, and their medieval

continuator, Aquinas—general principles are, in the final analysis, either scientific because they are the self-evident ground of logically necessary consequences verified in a vague general way in common-sense experience or hypothetical because productive of useful consequences without being evident in themselves. The rise of scientific technology in the seventeenth century doomed the traditional pre-Renaissance identification of science with philosophy. Thereafter, a radical rift arose between the types of ancient and modern science. Ancient science was unchangeably committed to the belief in self-evident first principles intuited with "the eyes of the mind"; modern science was no less firmly committed to first principles, but first principles invented rather than intuited and accepted rather for the verifiability of their consequences than for the self-evidence of their truth. In modern scientific thought the hypothetical-deductive procedure, known but not cherished by the ancients, has displaced their traditionally preferred categorical-deductive procedure, particularly in the realm of natural science. As responding to a persisting set of individual and social needs, to which the new natural science was, if not indifferent, at least neutral, the displaced classical procedure continued to assert itself in the more complex and less controllable realms of psychological and sociological phenomena, particularly in the deeply disturbed realm of knowledge theory. Originating with Descartes and mightily advanced by Kant, post-Renaissance metaphysical thought has sought in vain to recover or reconstruct some link between the traditional metaphysical wisdom of the West and modern technological science. All such efforts stemmed, according to Professor Frank, from a common traditional concept of mathematics as a deductive science from self-evident principles.

If the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry in the nineteenth century established unambiguously the hypothetical as opposed to the categorical character of ancient as well as modern mathematics, thus robbing metaphysics of the last unchallenged ground for its belief in self-evident principles, the same discovery has quite unexpectedly provided a new insight with which to close the gap opened between philosophy and science in the Renaissance and widened with the discovery and development of Newtonian mechanics. It is his detailed, perceptive manifestation and interpretation of this insight which, for this reviewer, provide the most illuminating section of Professor Frank's work. A condensed analysis of the textbook proof of the similarity of triangles, premised on the Euclidean axioms of the straight line and parallels, shows that, far from expressing self-evident truths, these axioms are such stipulated relations between terms as yield the same results whatever meaning one assigns to the related terms. Using appropriate Lobatchevskian axioms, it can be shown that the theorem of similar triangles vanishes and with it the traditional inter-

pretation of the physical universe as essentially homogeneous. Such purely formal mathematical systems are shown to acquire a physical meaning through operational definitions which are extrinsic to the physically meaningless terms of the formal system. In their formal structure (axioms and theorems) the enriched or interpreted systems are certain but tell us nothing about the real world; in their physical interpretation, they become vague and uncertain but tell us something verifiable about the physical world.

Professor Frank holds that both ancient and modern science can be shown to exhibit such purely formal structures whose terms are interpreted or defined operationally. To sustain this thesis, he traces in detail the development of the theory of motion (essential, he says, to all human science) from the "organismic mechanics" of Aristotle and the medievals through Newtonian to modern relativistic and quantum mechanics. In accepting the concept of the void as empty or absolute space, known to Plato but rejected by Aristotle, Newton was able to formulate the basic principles of his mechanics: (1) that a body at rest or in motion, upon which no unbalanced force is acting, maintains its state of rest or performs a rectilinear motion with a constant speed and (2) that an unbalanced force acting upon a body will equal the product of the mass of the body times the acceleration that the force produces. Without, however, the specification of an inertial system and the formulation of operational definitions for the concepts of force and mass, these laws turn out to be nothing more than arbitrary linguistic conventions without physical meaning. In eliminating the inelegant dichotomy of the terrestrial and celestial physics of Aristotle's organismic mechanics, the mechanics of Newton constituted a decisive advance in man's science of the physical universe. Yet its foundations are not without "organismic" or "theological" vestiges in their identification of absolute space with the divine sensorium and their assumption of a directive intelligence for such observed regularities in planetary motions which cannot be derived from the assumption of arbitrary initial positions and speeds. Twentieth-century mechanics has eliminated these "remnants of organismic physics" by dropping the concept of absolute space and taking the system of the fixed stars as a sufficient inertial system for the validity and verification of Newtonian mechanics for all masses with speeds which are small compared to the speed of light. For high-speed particles, the Newtonian mechanics, without losing any of its formal validity, is operationally unsuitable. Professor Frank sharpens further this key distinction between the formal and operational elements of human science in a complex technical analysis of the scientific meaning of relativistic and quantum physics as opposed

to the irrelevant and often enough contradictory metaphysical interpretations of them. The result is a view of philosophy contracted to the philosophy of science, which, in turn, is construed as a continuing "research in the 'pragmatics of science' which envisages a coherent system containing the physical and biological as well as the sciences of human behavior" (p. 360). At the level of his analysis and presentation of the "pragmatics" of physical science and such of the other natural and behavioral sciences as employ, more or less successfully, the formal and operational procedures of the physical sciences, Professor Frank's work strikes one as cogent and convincing in its insights. This reviewer cannot say as much for his analysis and interpretation of classical philosophical thought as exemplified in the Aristotelian-Thomist theory of motion. It is the case that Aristotelian and Newtonian mechanics can be compared in their common bearing on the realm of observable locomotion. In such a comparison, the Aristotelian mechanics would appear to be a primitive and highly "speculative" scientific theory. Yet to be truly and significantly fertile in insights into the complex laws of the development and differentiation of scientific types, it would seem necessary that such comparisons should not ignore the historical, linguistic, and doctrinal contexts of their terms. In the view of this reviewer, it is not the case that the Aristotelian mechanics is, in the historical, linguistic, and doctrinal contexts of its formulation, a sufficient exemplification of the much more general and deeper Aristotelian theory of motion. It would seem no less a distortion of the Aristotelian doctrine of motion to represent it in terms of its mechanics than to represent the mechanics of Newton in terms of its organismic or theological elements. A more fruitful level of comparison would have been one suggested but not generally applied by Professor Frank himself, the intention of the theory's or doctrine's author. But with this criterion, much of the cogency of the author's insistence upon the organismic or finalistic character of the Aristotelian doctrine as a sign of its philosophical nature would vanish. Thus, Greek and Roman atomism, though externally and apparently more congenial to modern scientific thought by virtue of their nonfinalism, are in intention no less philosophical or scientific in the ancient sense than the finalism of Plato or Aristotle. In short, beyond the narrow range of the special epistemology of modern physical science, the authentically philosophical content of this work is not apparent.

Throughout, Professor Frank employs the ancient dialectic of discovery in accumulating and contrasting a vast company of philosophical spokesmen both ancient and modern. Unless correctly interpreted, such disparate opinions tend rather to confuse than clarify the argument. Thus, it is simply not clear that the Aristotelian-Thomist principle of efficient caus-

ality—whatever is in motion is moved by another—is derived, except disputatiously, from the argument attributed to St. Thomas (p. 94). In the context of Aristotelian-Thomist thought, the meaning and import of this "principle" follows from an inductive analysis of motion-in-general rather than the special case of locomotion. Accordingly, the disastrous consequences for traditional religious and ethical beliefs of its disproof by the Newtonian principle of inertia, no less than that disproof itself, are not established.

Of the two primitive elements of Professor Frank's general view of human knowledge—namely, common-sense experience and general principles—the former particularly recurs ambiguously in his argument. Sometimes it signifies both the contents of the observer's immediate external sensation and their assertion, as, for example, in the observation and statement of the presence of moving bodies or "spots" in the observer's field of external vision. Again, it often designates the experimental data collected in a laboratory report. Still again, it signifies the set of statements about reality which all averagely educated men, in a given historical period, readily accept and agree upon. This spread of diverse meanings in the loose usage of a primitive term is not without significant bearing on the interpretation of the general principles which are derived, whether by intuition or invention, from them. It provides, among other dialectical advantages (?), a useful device for describing, if not understanding, the process by which new "truths," which are initially rejected as conflicting with accepted "truths," in time become themselves assimilated in the public mind as self-evident; for example, the nineteenth-century belief in the self-evidence of the Newtonian laws. Self-evidence in this context becomes little more than consensus, whether true or false, a criterion useful perhaps in the dialectical order of discovery but simply irrelevant in the scientific order of demonstration.

In his closing chapters, Professor Frank formulates inconclusive views on causality and validation in scientific thought, views consonant with, yet not simply iterative of, the views of Mach and Reichenbach. Here again the clarity of the argument is diminished by the intrusion of numerous disparate quoted opinions. The author's practice of not identifying his ancient sources in the footnotes with the same precision with which he identifies his modern sources makes intolerably difficult their checking (p. 368, nn. 7 and 8). Finally, such relatively trivial but no less irritating typographical errors as the omission of key words (p. 62), occasional misprints ("externally" for "eternally" [p. 97]), and footnote references to nonexistent sections of the printed text (p. 376, n. 17) diminish the pedagogical effectiveness of the book.

JAMES ALBERTSON, S.J., *Alma College, California*

Causality and Chance in Modern Physics. **By David Bohm. Foreword by Louis de Broglie. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand; London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. Pp. xi + 170. $5.00.**

The two most revolutionary concepts introduced into physical theory by quantum mechanics in the 1920's were the description of mechanical processes in terms of probabilities (Born) and the uncertainty principle (Heisenberg). While the latter is a direct algebraic consequence of the fundamental commutation relations of quantum mechanics, the former is an interpretation essentially extrinsic to the theory, justified mainly by the ease and directness which it lends to the comparison between theory and experiment.

Though the probability interpretation of quantum mechanics had its early foes, such as Louis de Broglie, it soon gained the day and is now the conventional and almost unanimously accepted view. The book under review is the work of one of de Broglie's successors in dissent, a former professor of physics at Princeton University. Bohm's program, as outlined here, is a two-pronged attack on the conventional analysis. On the one hand, he is concerned with showing that quantum mechanics itself cannot be justifiably regarded as the ultimate description of physical processes and that its concomitant uncertainty principle is thus not universally applicable. In his own words,

> . . . there is good reason to assume the existence of a sub quantum-mechanical level that is more fundamental than that at which the present quantum theory holds. Within this new level could be operating qualitatively new kinds of laws, leading to those of the current theory as approximations and limiting cases in much the same way that the laws of the atomic domain lead to those of the macroscopic domain. The indeterminacy principle would then apply only in the quantum level, and would have no relevance at all at lower levels (p. 69).

On the other hand, Bohm questions the probability interpretation of quantum mechanics even when applied on the level of atomic processes where it has achieved such success. Basing his argument on the postulate of levels of physical activity existing below the atomic domain of quantum mechanics, Bohm proposes to interpret the wave function of Schroedinger as representing an actual force field which tends to concentrate the atomic particles (for example, electrons) in the regions of its maximum intensity, but whose effect is partially nullified by the random fluctuations of these

particles due to processes on the lower levels. The presentation of this new interpretation is nontechnical and nonmathematical, but references are given to the scientific journals where Bohm and his coworkers have offered detailed arguments.

Considered simply as a postulate, Bohm's assumption of levels below the quantum mechanical is no more justified than the contradictory one which assumes quantum mechanics to be the final theory. But from experimental evidence (mostly at very high energies) it seems clear that quantum mechanics is *not* the final theory, and Bohm's hypothesis offers one possibility for progress and the development of more adequate and comprehensive constructions. Whether or not that possibility will in fact be realized remains to be seen.

Bohm has much more to say of a directly philosophical character, but for the most part it is questionable and immaterial to the main argument.

RICHARD J. BLACKWELL, *John Carroll University*

An Introduction to Philosophy. **By Daniel J. Sullivan. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1957. Pp. xiii + 288. $3.75.**

How can the beginning student be brought to an understanding of the peculiar nature of philosophical problems and of philosophical thinking toward the solutions of such problems? Books which are entitled "Introduction to Philosophy" are attempts to answer this question. Two approaches are frequently used. The first is a survey of the history of philosophy, or at least of the history of Greek philosophy. The assumption is that the actual development of Western philosophy is a natural and congenial development for the beginning student. The danger to be avoided here is historical relativism. The second approach is a survey of systematic philosophy. The assumption is that the student can appreciate the nature of philosophy in general by means of a summary of its parts. The danger here is unsupported dogmatism.

Mr. Sullivan uses both of these approaches with effect. The text itself is well-organized and understandably written with constant attention to the limitations of the beginning student.

Approximately the first quarter of the text is devoted to a survey of philosophical thought from Thales to Aristotle. The author's point is to show that Aristotle represents the culmination of Greek philosophy and in turn supplies the foundations for perennial philosophy. However, in defense of this position, Mr. Sullivan interprets the Aristotelian forms as

reincarnated Platonic Ideas. Hence Aristotle does not really oppose the Platonic position but rather brings its truth to fulfillment (p. 46). This interpretation is certainly open to question.

The remaining three quarters of the text is a survey of systematic philosophy which uses man as the focal point. From a discussion of the cognitive and appetitive functions in man the text proceeds to an examination of man's individual and social moral character, of the material world, and finally of the universe of being and God. This body of systematic philosophy, based on Aristotelian-Thomistic realism, is said to be perennial in the sense that its truth is everlasting. However, it is not the work of any one individual philosopher or school and is in need of constant renewal in each succeeding generation.

Although this survey of systematic philosophy occupies the larger part of the book, the author does not have enough time in one volume to develop his points fully. Hence it is really a survey of the main conclusions of systematic philosophy, a kind of skeleton outline in which the flesh and blood of living argumentation to these conclusions has receded into the background. And it is precisely this intellectual labor of personally giving birth to these conclusions that constitutes the life of philosophy. However, if this book prods its readers to think and read further toward such an experience, then it has adequately served its purpose as an "Introduction to Philosophy."

NICHOLAS RESCHER, *Lehigh University*

John Locke: A Biography. **By Maurice Cranston. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. xvi + 496. $8.00.**

On Locke's death, an escritoire filled with his personal papers passed to his heir and remained in his family until sold by them to the Bodleian Library in 1948. Previously only the unsatisfactory biography of Locke by Lord King, at one time a possessor of these papers, was able to draw upon this resource. By use of it, and with thoroughgoing exploitation of other manuscript Locke materials scattered through libraries and private collections in England, the Continent, and America, Maurice Cranston has produced a superb biography, whose every chapter bears witness to his diligent and painstaking workmanship.

While previous biographies of Locke—especially Fox Bourne's standard two-volume work—have made the philosopher out as a paragon, Cranston's work is refreshingly honest. Over against his many and signal virtues, Locke had various human shortcomings whose frank presentation in this biography is one of its sources of fascination.

Locke was decidedly materialistic. He was an anxious landlord. In a letter of condolence to the son of a long-standing friend who had just died, Locke included a record of money owed and books borrowed. "Even in this time of genuine grief, the philosophers's first thought seems to have been for his material possessions." Nor did Locke scruple to invest in the slave trade and other colonial ventures in which—from his vantage-point as colonial administrator—he could see sure profit. "Locke might therefore be considered a member of the investing class whose interests his economic writings signally upheld," Cranston writes; and again, "Unlike Milton, who called for liberty in the name of liberty, Locke was content to ask for liberty in the name of trade; and unlike Milton, he achieved his end."

Locke was a vain man. He was loath to acknowledge indebtedness—especially to the unpopular Hobbes. He was in all things circumspect and in many things furtive, devious, and secretive. In a list of the five "most lasting pleasures of life," drawn up by him in his mid-thirties, "reputation" ranks second, outdistancing even "knowledge" (third), and leaving behind to the very end "the expectation of eternal and incomprehensible happiness in another world"; surely an odd ranking for a Christian theorist.

All of the less admirable traits of Locke's character come to a focus in his act of posthumous ingratitude to Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury had launched Locke into the great world; and to him Locke owed, direct benefits aside, his influential and remunerative status as a power in Whig councils. Yet in a letter to Lord Pembroke after dismissal (on the grounds of his intimate association with Shaftesbury and his politics) from a studentship at Christ Church, Locke wrote, "I cannot but complain of it as a hard case: that having reaped so little advantage from my service to him whilst living I should suffer so much on that account now he is dead." Cranston remarks that "Locke's comment on Shaftesbury is significantly at odds with what he said at other and better times about his former patron. Here, and here, so far as I can ascertain, alone, did Locke even hint that Shaftesbury had treated him parsimoniously."

But such deficiencies are not exhaustive of Locke's personality or of the life as portrayed in Cranston's biography. I have dwelt on them solely to indicate that here is a fresh and honest perspective. Cranston's enthusiasm for his work, his genuine devotion to the person that was Locke, and his deft flair for historical portraiture combine to make his *John Locke* a first-rate biography and a thoroughly readable, indeed an absorbing, book.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

"Publication in North America" will be understood to refer not only to works originally published in that area, but also to works originally published in some other country and simultaneously or subsequently issued by some North American publisher under his own imprint. In the latter case (if it is known), the book will be marked by the symbol ‡ in the left-hand margin.

The procedure is as follows:

1. *Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.*
2. *Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.*
3. *Books received by* The Modern Schoolman *will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.*

Adam, August. *The Primacy of Love.* Trans. from the German by Elisabethe Corathiel Noonan. Westminster: Newman Press, 1958. Pp. 225. $3.25.

Adler, Mortimer Jerome. *A Dialectic of Morals.* New York, Frederick Ungar Co. Pp. 127. $3.50.

———. *The Idea of Freedom.* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1958. Pp. xxvii + 689. $7.50.

This is the first major publication of the Institute for Philosophical Research and is the product of five years of work by a group of scholars. It is natural, therefore, that the volume should contain a rather extensive explanation of the method and aims of the present inquiry.

The immediate aim of this book is a comprehensive and intelligibly ordered view of what men have held about freedom. Accepting the fact of philosophical diversity, the author and his colleagues believe that differences are not always simply irrelevant to each other, and that, when differences can be sharply joined, an "issue" exists, concerning which truth can be reached by philosophical methods. They likewise hold that differences have most commonly never developed into true controversies, because principles, definitions, method, aims, and the like, have too often remained implicit. They view their task as the construction of the issues as such.

The method, then, is an *analysis* of what thinkers have said about freedom, in order to lay bare the basic issues at stake. As they maintain, fruitful discussion is possible only when the participants

agree on precisely the points concerning which they have different views. This analysis and confrontation they call "dialectic."

In carrying out this program, the subject of "freedom" is identified at two levels. At the first level, freedom is discussed in relation to circumstances. At the second level, freedom is related to the self (self-realization, self-perfection, self-determination). The conclusion is a classification of theories about freedom and a statement of what is called "a general understanding of freedom."

There are bibliographies of works referred to (pp. 623-40) and of other works examined (pp. 641-63), and separate indices to Book I (presentation of aims and method) and Book II.

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, ST. *'Libellus de Alchimia' Ascribed to Albertus Magnus.* Trans. from the Borgnet Latin. Ed. Sister Virginia Heines. Foreword by Pearl Kibre. Berkeley, Univ. of California Press. Pp. 101. $3.50.

American Classics Reconsidered. Ed. Harold C. Gardiner, S.J. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. x + 307. $4.95.

This group of essays on some of the greater nineteenth-century American writers is not only a book of literary criticism but expands into broader areas of cultural history and the history of ideas. Father Gardiner also contributes an introductory essay, pointing out the unity of theme of the book and the kind of work done in it. Successive chapters then deal with Emerson (by Robert C. Pollock), James Fenimore Cooper (by Charles A. Brady), Brownson (by Alvan S. Ryan), Hawthorne (by Joseph Schwartz), Longfellow (by Joseph E. O'Neill, S.J.), Poe (by Jeremiah K. Durick), Thoreau (by Michael F. Moloney), Melville (by Geoffrey Stone), Whitman (by Ernest Sandeen), and the literary historians: Prescott, Bancroft, Motley, and Parkman (by Mason Wade).

ANGELL, ROBERT COOLEY. *Free Society and Moral Crisis.* Foreword by Reinhold Niebuhr. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958. Pp. 260. $6.00.

[ARISTOTLE.] *Aristotle's Selections.* Trans. from the Greek by F. H. Peters. Introd. by Thomas Yoseloff. New York, Fine Editions Press. Pp. 247. $3.95.

[——]. *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument.* Trans. and ed. Gerald F. Else. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 686. $11.00.

[——]. *The Pocket Aristotle.* Ed. Justin Kaplan. New York, Pocket Books. 50¢

———. *On Poetry and Style.* Trans. G. M. A. Grube. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Aug., 1958. Paper, 75¢

———. *Topica et Sophistici Elenchi.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 272. $4.00.

ARTZ, FREDERICK BINKERD. *The Mind of the Middle Ages.* New York, Alfred A. Knopf. Pp. 590. $6.50.

[AUGUSTINE, ST.] *An Augustine Synthesis.* Ed. Erich Przywara, S.J. New York: Harper & Bros.; Apr., 1958. Paper, $1.95.

———. *On Christian Doctrine.* Trans. with introd. by D. W. Robertson, Jr. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xxxii + 169. Paper, 95¢

This work of St. Augustine's could almost be called a treatise on Christian education; it deals directly with the formation of a Christian student and shows him how to read and live the Bible.

The introduction is an excellent presentation of St. Augustine's method. Particularly useful is the brief but very accurate account of the allegorical (or spiritual) method of interpretation, which is distinguished from a "scientific" analysis on the one hand and from

the use of metaphor; this latter distinction is one which is not often made (pp. xiv-xvi).

This edition is excellently printed and well bound.

Aurelius, Marcus. *Meditations of Marcus Aurelius.* Trans. from the Latin by Meric Casaubon. Introd. by Matthew Arnold. New York, Dial Press. Pp. 245. $5.00.

Authority. Ed. Carl Joachim Friedrich. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 242. $5.00.

Bach, George Leland. *Inflation.* Providence, Brown Univ. Press. Pp. 110 $2.50.

Baier, Kurt. *The Moral Point of View.* Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 338. $4.00.

Baldwin, Armand Jean, *Christian Principles of Political Science.* Latrobe: Archabbey Press, 1957. Pp. 160. $3.00.

Banfield, Edward C., and Banfield, Laura Fasano. *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society.* Glencoe: Free Press, 1958. Pp. 204. $4.00.

Barrett, William. *Irrational Man: A Study in Existentialist Philosophy.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Aug., 1958. $4.00.

Bartlett, Sir Frederic Charles. *Thinking.* New York: Basic Books, 1958. Pp. 203. $4.00.

Baylis, Charles A. *Ethics: Principles of Wise Choice.* New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1958. Pp. 383. $4.00.

Beach, Waldo. *Conscience on Campus.* New York: Association Press, 1958. Pp. 124. $2.50.

Beardsley, Monroe C. *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.; Sept., 1958.

Bernard, Claude. *An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine.* Trans. Henry Copley Greene. Introd. by Lawrence J. Henderson; foreword by I. Bernard Cohen. New York: Dover Pubns., 1958. Pp. [7] + xix + 226. Paper, $1.50.

This classic had been reprinted by the same publishers in 1957; this edition adds the new foreword by Professor Cohen. Professor Cohen points out some of the significant ideas advanced by Bernard and notes that present-day students will not accept his criticisms of statistics.

The edition, as was the earlier one, is beautifully printed and attractively bound, and is offered at a remarkably low price for the high quality.

Bertrand Russell's Best. Ed. R. E. Egner. New York: New American Lib.; Sept., 1958. 50¢

Bieler, Ludwig. *The Grammarian's Craft.* Brooklyn, Folia. $1.00.

Bohr, Niels Henrik David. *Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958. Pp. 109. $3.95.

Bond, Earl Danford. *One Mind, Common to All.* Foreword by Francis J. Braceland. New York, Macmillan Co. Pp. 207. $4.50.

‡ Boss, Medard. *The Analysis of Dreams.* Trans. from the German by Arnold J. Pomerans. Foreword by E. B. Strauss. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958, Pp. 223. $6.00.

‡ Bouyer, Louis. *Newman: His Life and Spirituality.* Trans. J. Lewis May. Introd. by H. Francis Davis. New York: P. J. Kennedy & Sons, 1958. Pp. xiii + 391. $7.50.

This is an excellent translation of what has in a short time come to be considered the authoritative life of Cardinal Newman. The philosophical ideas of Newman, which are only slowly being interpreted by recent studies, are referred to in this life only indirectly and not by way of major interest. But the life itself and the theological ideas are presented in a way that is both illuminating and sympathetic. The

book belongs with every collection of works by or about Cardinal Newman.

Bowman, Archibald Allan. *The Absurdity of Christianity and Other Essays.* Ed. with introd. by Charles W. Hendel. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xxxiii + 62. Paper, 75¢

The essays contained here are more theological than philosophical, though it may be pointed out that the author's intent is to explain the very nature of religion, faith, and God to an audience that is obsessed with the secular view of life. In some sense, therefore, these essays can also be considered to pertain to the philosophy of religion.

The lengthy introduction locates the general work of Bowman and points out the special argument of each of the essays. In particular, the editor shows that the "absurdity" of which Bowman speaks is not an existentialist blind leap or a Tertullianist irrationalism but precisely an absurdity from a limited point of view: that of the secular mind. The view in which the spiritual or supernatural enters the ambit of human life is the dimension of the "subjective mode of existence," which is not completely explained either by these essays or by the editor.

Bowman, Sylvia E. *The Year 2000.* New York: Bookman Associates, 1958. Pp. 404. $6.00.

Bréhier, Emile. *The Philosophy of Plotinus.* Trans. Joseph Thomas. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. vii + 205. $4.50.

This is an excellent translation of one of the best-known works on Plotinus. It has long been considered—and justly— the most useful introduction to the subtle and intricate Plotinian philosophy. M. Bréhier himself reviewed this translation, wrote a special chapter, "The Sensible World and Matter," for it, and revised the notes and selective bibliography.

Bréhier's presentation is in the main faithful to Plotinus. He appreciates the force and importance of the various Plotinian themes and knows where to place the crucial issues. If there is a defect of sympathy, it is due to a kind of Neo-Kantian rationalism which prevents him from taking seriously any affirmation of a completely transcendent reality. If this defect is allowed for, the book can be most useful to all, whether they wish merely a general understanding of one of the great thinkers or are preparing for an intensive study of ancient philosophy.

Broadbent, D. E. *Perception and Communication.* New York: Pergamon Press; June, 1958. $8.50.

Bronowski, Jacob. *Science and Human Values.* New York. Messner. Pp. 94. $3.00.

Brown Roger. *Words and Things.* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press; July, 1958. $7.50.

Bruehl, Charles P., and Campbell, William E. *Psychology. The Study of Man's Normal Mental Life.* Villanova, Pa., Villanova Press. Pp. 400. $5.50.

Bruehl, Lawrence. *The Death Blow to Communism.* New York: Vantage Press, 1958. Pp. 426. $5.00.

This is an attempt to construct a comprehensive philosophy of things, life, and society; the author is an engineer and works in the psychological department of a computor laboratory. The author presents his own version of natural law, whose key components are position, operation, and duration. In terms of it he tries to give new definitions of all key terms of philosophy and social science. The author states his basic principles thus: "1. Every being is characterized by the total of its structural elements (position).

2. Every being has an assembly of interior elements. 3. Every being has exterior relations to other being" (p. 104). On the same page, he claims that "equality . . . is a transcendental. In ordinary language, equality is expressed by the auxiliary verb 'to be' . . ."

The author has over 500 references to St. Thomas, and most of his other references are to Scholastic authors. It is doubtful whether he has correctly interpreted more than a small fraction of them. Most of the snippets he quotes he denies or criticizes. The application of the basic principles to politics and economics seems to be really relatively common-sense views asserted baldly, on the alleged ground of their derivation from the basic principles.

BUBER, MARTIN. *I and Thou.* Trans. Ronald Gregor Smith. 2d. ed. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. xii + 137. $1.75.

The translation of this classic was first published in 1937. The second edition contains a few minor revisions. The translator has written a new introduction, in which he stresses the attitude which a reader must take in order to profit deeply.

The major difference in this new edition is a "Postscript" written by Buber himself, in which he tries to answer some of the questions readers of this work have asked him and to clarify some of his positions. The first clarification concerns the sense in which we can stand in the *I-Thou* relationship to the world around us. The second is our relationship to spirit as we find it in the world, in history, art, and "inspiration." The third discusses the situations between men in which full mutuality cannot be attained, not by reason of any imperfection in the participants, but because of the very situation itself (for example, the teacher-student relation). The fourth is a clarification of what Buber means by speaking of God as a "Person." This explanation is well done; yet a Thomist misses the added clarity that would result from an adequate notion of analogy and an intellectualist (but *non*-rationalistic) approach to the problem of the proof for the existence of God.

BUGBEE, HENRY G., JR. *The Inward Morning.* Introd. by Gabriel Marcel. State College, Penn.: Bald Eagle Press, 1958. Pp. 232. $5.00.

Metaphysics is in a way the subject of this book, a metaphysics which stands to science and action as the dawn to the day. It is a reflective metaphysics written in journal form, and essentially so, for the author considers that our contacts with essential truth are never permanent or systematizable but must be seized when they occur. Moreover, the book can be said to have themes, though it can hardly be said to be about any objects. The themes (very tentatively indicated) are such as these: the nature of reflection, understanding, experience, realism, the human condition, certainty, well-being, commitment versus utilitarianism, the nature of existence and of truth. In this mode of thinking, the evil counterparts which one might expect are to be found: faithlessness, objectivity, science, object, thing, heteronomy. There is no index to this book—one would most likely be incompatible with the type of reflection engaged in.

The introduction by Gabriel Marcel is enthusiastic and helpful in that it shows the significance of some themes.

BURKE, EDMUND. *Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful.* Ed. J. T. Boulton. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Aug., 1958. $4.50.

BURROW, TRIGANT. *A Search for Man's Sanity.* New York, Oxford Univ. Press. Pp. 639. $8.75.

BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT. *The History of Science.* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. $3.00.

Carnap, Rudolf. *Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications.* New York: Dover Pubns.; Aug., 1958. $1.85.

———. *Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. 268. $1.65.

Carpenter, William Seal. *Foundations of Modern Jurisprudence.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1958. Pp. 236. $3.25.

Carus, Paul. *History of the Devil and the Idea of Evil.* New York: University Books; Aug., 1958. $10.00.

Cary, Joyce. *Art and Reality.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Aug., 1958. $3.00.

Cauchy, Venant. *Désir naturel et béatitude chez saint Thomas.* Montréal: Fides, 1958. Pp. 126. Paper, $2.50.

The meaning of these terms has acquired a special significance in recent years, when the gratuity of the supernatural order was brought into the same context. The author proposes to show that the text of St. Thomas does not conflict with this gratuity. He begins by considering the relation between the efficaciousness of the Divine Will in relation to the contingency of the world. He then examines St. Thomas's formal texts on "natural," "supernatural" (and the history of these terms), the supernatural end, natural desire, and obediential potency. He then takes up the historical context of St. Thomas's texts and in the light of them tries to answer textual difficulties. Finally he takes up the question of natural end and natural happiness.

It is good to have a careful historical examination of some of these texts. The author shows clearly that some texts of St. Thomas do not bear on the "natural" as in the relationship "natural-supernatural" but as in the relationship "natural-elicited (free)". But the problem cannot be eliminated entirely. The author criticizes, often effectively, many recent solutions, holding that the traditional solutions of men like Cajetan and Cathrein are both Thomistic and correct. However, the necessary logical relations between nature and end are not so simply disposed of; and there is some confusion between the "necessary willing" of merely formal objects and the real elicited acts directed to real concrete ends.

Chisholm, Roderick M. *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. xi + 203.

The author wishes to investigate some of the puzzles that arise when we think or talk about perceiving. His program thus sounds like the project of an analysis. True, he does analyze a number of propositions, especially those which express doctrines that seem to him inadequate or wrong. But by and large his program is not reductionist at all. In fact, a very important part of the book is an examination of what the author calls the empiricist interpretation of perception; namely, that the *only* criterion of evidence is the way things appear.

After laying the ground by defining his terms, the author turns to a discussion of evidence in the second part. Here he is most concerned with stating marks of evidence which will enable us to identify at least some evidences. In the third part, the author looks at the problem of the object of sensation, devoting considerable attention to the question of sense data and appearances.

Chroust, Anton-Hermann. *Socrates, Man and Myth.* Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1958. Pp. xiv + 336. $6.75.

What do we know about the historical Socrates? By means of a most painstaking analysis of ancient texts and a consideration of all the theories that have been propounded, the author concludes that we know almost nothing. He argues that the literary accounts of

Socrates deliberately intended to create a myth, and that they therefore show rather the ideas and activities of the Socratics than the facts about Socrates. He proposes the hypothesis that Plato's *Gorgias* was a counterattack, occasioned by the *Kategoriae Socratous* of Polycrates. Finally, he suggests that Socrates was a "politician" working to reform the state behind the scenes. As is evident, the author relies heavily on Xenophon, but with a great deal of critical interpretation.

CHU, T. *Law and Society in Traditional China.* New York: Lounz, 1958. $10.50.

[CICERO.] *Tullius Ciceronis, de Natura Deorum.* Ed. Arthur S. M. Pease. Vol. 2, Books 2 and 3. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Aug., 1958. $20.00.

COHEN OF BIRKENHEAD, LORD. *Sherrington: Physiologist, Philosopher and Poet.* Springfield: C. C Thomas Co., 1958. Pp. 122. $3.50.

COMPTON. CHARLES H. *William James, Philosopher and Man.* Foreword by Lucien Price. New York, Scarecrow Press. Pp. 229. $4.50.

Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem. Ed. Herbert Feigl and others. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1958. Pp. 563. $7.00.

COONEY, TIMOTHY. *Ultimate Desires.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. 100. $2.75.

This book is written to provide some kind of basis for ethics. The author believes that most men are concerned with ethical questions but that philosophy has hitherto failed to provide any basis for answering such questions. He feels that the Humean position—"we can be certain only that some ideas exist"—is the only real certitude; all else is doubtful. But from such a position nothing at all follows. Hence, to ground an ethics, he makes ontological assumptions and takes the position that the best ontology is the one that makes the fewest assumptions. His assumptions are that people exist and have desires. He next argues that there are three levels of desire: physical, social, and "cosmological" (in the Kantian sense of questions about the universe as a whole). He is agnostic about any transcendent reality but thinks that this is unimportant, since we can strive for perfection in ourselves.

The author is evidently well intentioned. He has picked up from various philosophical systems their doubts and limitations, yet retains his common-sense feeling that we ought to have ideals and ought to work for them. The over-all outcome is naturally disappointing.

COULTON, G. G. *Medieval Faith and Symbolism.* New York, Harper & Bros. Pp. 464. Paper, $1.85.

CULBERTSON, JAMES THOMAS. *Mathematics and Logic for Digital Devices* Princeton: Van Nostrand Co., 1958. Pp. 234. $4.85.

CUSHMAN, ROBERT E. *Therapeia.* Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1958. Pp. 344. $6.00.

DAVIES, ROBERT M. *The Humanism of Paul Elmer More.* New York: Bookman Associates, 1958. Pp. 222. $5.00

DAWSON, CHRISTOPHER HENRY. *Religion and Culture.* New York: Meridian Books. Pp. 230. Paper, $1.25.

DESCARTES, RENÉ. *Philosophical Writings.* Trans. with introd. and notes by Norman Kemp Smith. New York: Modern Lib., 1958. Pp. 319. Paper, $1.65.

Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science. Ed. Sidney Hook. New York, New York Univ. Press. Pp. 252. $5.00.

DICKINSON, G. L. *Greek View of Life.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Sept., 1958. Paper, $1.75.

DIJKSTERHUIS, E. J. *Archimedes.* New York, Humanities Press. $12.50.

The Doctrine of Saint-Simon: An Exposition, First Year, 1828-1829. Trans. with notes and introd. by Georg G. Iggers. Preface by G. D. H. Cole. Boston: Beacon Press; Aug., 1958. Pp. xlvii + 286. $4.95.

DRAKE, HENRY L. *The People's Plato.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. xxiii + 633. $7.50.

This is a presentation of Plato's thought. Section One of Book One contains biographies of Plato and Socrates; well documented, these assume the more traditional view that Socrates was really such as Plato pictures him. The rest of the book contains sections of Platonic writing, with editorial introductions. The introductions are usually good. The "Platonic writing" is sometimes direct quotation (based, with changes, on the Jowett translation), sometimes abridgment, using the actual sentences of the original with omissions, sometimes rewriting after the manner of a digest. These Platonic writings have been arranged in a topical order in four books. The first book begins with the mission of Socrates, especially his trial and the conversations in jail. Then come chapters on theology, the nature of marriage, of bravery, moral education, reminiscence, and the nature of virtue. The second book has chapters on justice, the state and education, the place of women, the role of philosophy, perversions of the state, and the rewards of justice. The third book deals with the creation of the universe and of man, the golden age, the love of beauty, the history of Atlantis, the judgment after death, the meaning of love, the nature of knowledge, the theory of ideas, and pleasure and wisdom. The fourth book has two chapters of miscellaneous sayings; then come chapters on sophistry, rhetoric and wealth, aspects of virtue and friendship, some principles, and finally some views of Plato's on Socrates's mission. The author then concludes with a summary of some of these ideas. There are also a selective bibliography, the notes (including the identification of the sources quoted), and an index.

For those who are not specializing in philosophy, this abridged edition of Plato may well be serviceable. If people cannot, or will not, read the full-length originals, they can reap much of the same advantage from a condensation. And serious reflection on the nature of man and his destiny would be good for many.

Duns Scotus Philosophical Association Convention Report, 1958. Cleveland: Our Lady of Angels Seminary, 1958. Pp. x + 249. Paper.

This report contains a number of papers and some summary reports. The following papers were read: "Peter Olivi and the Doctrine of Free Will," by Turibius Niebrugge, O.F.M.; "Human Motivation," by Conall Dolan, O.F.M.; "William of Ockham and Papal Authority," by Aaron Pembleton, O.F.M.; "St. Bonaventure and the Eternal Creature," by Victorian Haladus, O.F.M.; "Music and the Mind," by Pierre Amen, O.F.M.; "Existential Import in Logic," by Clyde Ebenreck, O.F.M.; "Censorship," by Harry Speckman, O.F.M., and Mertin Classen, O.F.M.; and "Christian Humanism," by Cormac Knoll, O.F.M.

There are six summary reports on a variety of topics, mostly practical: juvenile delinquency, humor, energy, study habits, comic books, and a debate on the formal distinction. This volume also contains a cumulative index.

‡ DURKHEIM, EMILE. *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals.* Trans. from the French by Cornelia Brookfield. Glencoe: Free Press, 1958. Pp. 272. $5.00.

Eckardt, Ursula M. von. *Pursuit of Happiness in the Democratic Creed.* New York: Praeger, Inc.; Sept., 1958. $4.50.

Eddington, Arthur. *The Philosophy of Physical Science.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Sept., 1958. $1.75.

Eisely, Loren. *Darwin's Century: Evolution and the Men Who Discovered It.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1958. $5.00.

Eliade, Mircea. *Birth and Rebirth: Religious Meanings of Initiation in Human Culture.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Sept., 1958. $3.00.

———. *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom.* New York: Pantheon Books; Sept., 1958. $5.00.

Emergence of the Modern Mind, The. Ed. Frederick Charles Gruber. Philadelphia: Univ. of Penn. Press, 1958. Pp. 93. $2.50.

‡ Emmet, Dorothy Mary. *Function, Purpose and Powers.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958. Pp. 307. $6.50.

Erasmus. *Praise of Folly.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Sept., 1958. Paper, $1.35.

Essays in Moral Philosophy. Ed. A. I. Melden. Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press; Aug., 1958. $4.50.

Ethics. Ed. Oliver A. Johnson. New York: Dryden Press, 1958. Pp. 555. $5.75.

Existence. Ed. Rollo May and others. New York: Basic Books, 1958. Pp. 455. $7.50.

Faust, Clarence H. *Toward Understanding American Education.* Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1958. Pp. 30. Paper, 50¢

This brief lecture is intended to provide a scheme for understanding American schools. To some extent it does this by declaring that the school of today been shaped by four forces: inertia (the self-perpetuating curriculum), the development of new knowledge and the emergence of new key concepts, social need, and the ability of individuals. With regard to the second point, the author maintains that any school "system" or any theory of education must rest on some basic consensus. He asserts further that there is no longer any theological consensus, that philosophical consensus is absent except that "for us, the results of experience and experimentation are wholly valid, while abstract reasoning reflects mere opinion or even prejudice" (p. 22). He finally suggests that the new basis for consensus will be social and proposes the concept of "responsibility." An interesting and provocative analysis; and a tendentious one.

Feuer, Lewis Samuel. *Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. Pp. 333. $7.50.

Fisher, Seymour, and Cleveland, Sidney E. *Body Image and Personality.* Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1958. Pp. 431. $9.25.

Four Existentialist Theologians. Ed. Will Herberg. Garden City, Doubleday & Co. Pp. 320. Paper, $1.25.

Freud, Sigmund. *On Creativity and the Unconscious.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Oct., 1958. $1.85.

Friedlander, Paul. *Plato.* Vol. I, *An Introduction.* Trans. from the German by Hans Meyerhoff. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. Pp. 444. $5.00.

Friedrich, Carl Joachim. *The Philosoph of Law in Historical Perspective.* Chicago : Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. 262. $4.75.

Gardeil, H. D., o.p. *Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Vol. I, *Logic.* Trans. John A. Otto. St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co.

———. *Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Vol. II, *Cosmology.* Trans. John A. Otto. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1958. Pp. xii + 218. $3.75.

Previously published was Volume III, *Psychology.* Father Gardeil's series is well-known and is justly considered one of the standard

Thomistic textbooks. In the present volume, he concentrates on the purely philosophical parts of Aristotle's physical doctrine and does not attempt to reconcile it with modern science (though the translator tries to do this by means of footnotes; for example, his footnote on "natural place" and gravitation, p. 101). The topics taken up in successive chapters are: the principles of mobile being, quantity and quality, nature, causes of mobile being, motion, the concomitants of motion, proof of the Prime Mover, the Aristotelian astronomy, and concluding evaluation.

In addition, the translator has given as appendices a number of translated readings from St. Thomas (pp. 164-208), mostly from the *Commentary on the Physics*, and also the *Principles of Nature*. These readings make the volume much more useful.

———. *Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Vol. IV, *Metaphysics.* Trans. John A. Otto. St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co.

GARDNER. *Logic Machines and Diagrams.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.; July, 1958.

GARVIN, JOSEPH N. *Summa contra Haereticos.* Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press; June, 1958.

GEOGHEGAN, WILLIAM D. *Platonism in Recent Religious Thought.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 206. $4.00.

GIERKE, OTTO. *Political Theories of the Middle Age.* Trans. with introd. by Frederic William Maitland. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. Pp. 288. Paper, $1.95.

‡ GILBY, THOMAS, O.P. *The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. xxvi + 357. $5.00.

After a brief introduction, in which the historical background is sketched and a glimpse of St. Thomas's background and principles is given, the author gives a detailed account of the influences at work (pp. 1-90). These influences are of four kinds: the theologians (including the Bible as containing also secular wisdom), the jurists, the social structure (including the influence of the new orders), and the philosophers.

The major part of the book is devoted to an exposition of what St. Thomas added to this background. First, the author analyzes St. Thomas's notion of law, showing how his philosophical approach enabled him to weld together disparate elements into a new and more comprehensive view of law as reason at work. Next, there is a discussion of human law, its nature, limits, and its relation to political society. This is followed by an extensive analysis of the notions of community, justice, common good, legal justice and moral virtue, the corporate group, and the state as a "person." The influence of Aristotle is treated separately, with an emphasis on the contribution of Aristotle to the whole theory of the nature and kinds of political society.

In a conclusion, the author assesses the influence of St. Thomas (not very great in his own time, a growing importance since the Spanish revival and Pope Leo XIII), then summarizes in a rather sweeping fashion the development of human groups from the primitive community-group, through the political group to a society of fellowship.

GLANVILL, JOSEPH. *Plus Ultra or the Progress and Advancement of Knowledge since the Days of Aristotle (1668).* Gainesville: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints; May, 1958. $7.50.

GOTSHALK, D. W. *The Promise of Modern Life.* Yellow Springs: Antioch Press, 1958. Pp. 128. $2.50.

GRANT, ROBERT M. *Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Thought.* New York, Humanities Press. $6.00.

Gray, Henry David. *Emerson.* New York: Frederick Ungar; June, 1958. $3.50.

Great Legal Philosophers. Ed. Clarence Morris. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press; Aug., 1958. $10.00.

Greene, Theodore Meyer. *Moral, Aesthetic, and Religious Insight.* New Brunswick, N.J.; Rutgers Univ. Press. Pp. 141. $2.75.

Grube, Georges Maximillen Antoine. *Plato's Thought.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. Pp. 337. Paper, $1.60.

Hadas, Moses. *The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Sept., 1958. 95¢

Hadfield, J. A. *Psychology and Morals.* 15th ed. New York: McBride Co.; Aug., 1958. $3.50.

Hall, Calvin S., and Lindzey, Gardner. *Theories of Personality.* New York: John Wiley & Sons. Pp. 572. $6.50.

‡ Hallett, H. F. *Benedict de Spinoza.* Fair Lawn, N.J.; Essential Books. Pp. 184. $4.00.

Hanna, Thomas. *The Thought and Art of Albert Camus.* Chicago, Henry Regnery Co. Pp. 223. $4.50.

Harrison, R. J. *Man the Peculiar Animal.* Baltimore: Penguin Books; June, 1958. 95¢

Hart, Charles A. *Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing.* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1958. $5.50.

Heidegger, Martin. *What Is Philosophy?* Trans. from the German with introd. by William Kuback and Jean T. Wilde. New York: Twayne Pubs., 1958. Pp. 97. $3.00

Heisenberg, Werner. *Physicist's Conception of Nature.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.; Sept., 1958.

———. *Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. 221. $4.00.

Herdan, G. *Language as Choice and Chance.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Aug., 1958. $15.00.

Hesburgh, Theodore M., c.s.c *Patterns for Educational Growth.* Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1958. Pp. xv + 71. $2.25.

The six addresses here offered were given on the occasion of the annual Mass of the Holy Spirit at the beginning of the school year by the distinguished president of the University of Notre Dame. Philosophical and theological ideas are touched on, as is to be expected, and yet presented more in an inspirational than in a didactic manner. The topics of the individual addresses are: wisdom and education; a theology of history and education; the mission of a Catholic university; education in a world of social challenge; the divine element in education; and education in a world of science.

Higgins, Thomas J., s.j. *Man as Man: The Science and Art of Ethics.* 2d ed. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. xiii + 585. $4.50.

The first edition of this popular textbook was published in 1949 and noted in The Modern Schoolman, xxvi [November 1949], 67). The revision has been extensive: a great part of the book has been rewritten for clarity and for more contemporary examples. The lists of readings at the end of each chapter have been entirely revised, and there are excellent references to the most recent studies. In addition, the movements of current thought, like positivism, emotivism, and communism, have been given considerably more attention. The section on natural law gives the current objections to natural law and provides brief answers. There is a section on situational ethics. In other respects, the book remains unchanged: the basic structure (general principles, individual ethics, social ethics) is the same; the combination of problem method and thesis method is kept; the judgments on moral issues remain the same.

The typography is in some respects better because of a more generous use of bold-face type.

[Hobbes, Thomas.] *Leviathan.* Parts I and II. Ed. with an introd. by Herbert W. Schneider. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xvii + 298. Paper, $1.00.

This edition reproduces the standard text, carefully compared with the first edition, together with the marginal headings; spelling and so on have been modernized. The editor and publisher have added explanatory footnotes and have tried to identify Hobbes's references. As a kind of prologue, the present edition begins with Chapter 46 of the third part (which, as the editor notes, is a kind of Hobbesian "discourse on method") and ends with the final chapter of Part Four, which is a conclusion.

The brief introduction gives a summary life of Hobbes and locates him in reference to religious and philosophical movements of his time. The editor notes that Hobbes wished to write a natural science of justice, which was to serve as ground for the laws of the absolute sovereign. He indicates that the Galilean method of natural science was to be used in this endeavor; he does not point out the typical nominalist clichés used by Hobbes. Hobbes, it is noted, was Puritan in tendency, with a Calvinist psychology; he was also a materialist (like Tertullian and other early sects, he thought God had some kind of "ethereal body").

The edition is excellently printed and sturdily bound, and, in the face of rising costs, still offered at prices comparable with those of the first works issued by this remarkable publisher.

Hughes, H. Stuart. *Consciousness and Society.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf; Sept., 1958. $6.00.

‡ *Humanism and Education in East and West.* An international round table discussion organized by UNESCO. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 224. $2.75.

‡ Humphries, Christmas, *Zen Buddhism.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. 254. $3.75.

Hungerland, Isabel C. *Poetic Discourse.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1958. Pp. 181. Paper, $3.00.

Husik, Isaac. *A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy.* New York, Meridian Books and Jewish Pubn. Soc. of America. Pp. 516. Paper, $1.95.

Inhelder, Barbel, and Piaget, Jean. *The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence.* Trans. Anne Parsons and Stanley Milgram. New York: Basic Books, 1958. Pp. 382. $6.75.

Islam: Muhammad and his Religion. Ed. with introd. by Arthur Jeffery. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xviii + 252. Paper, $1.75.

The editor gives a brief general introduction to the selections, as well as introductions to the longer passages and explanatory notes. The selections are from the Koran and from various traditional sources, as well as from a few modern interpreters. The organization of matter makes the volume very useful for a student who wishes direct knowledge of the sources of this great religious movement but does not have the time to read the very extensive, repetitious, and loosely organized original works.

The edition is neatly presented and sturdily bound.

James, William. *Talks to Teachers on Psychology; and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co.; Sept., 1958. $3.95; paper, 95¢

Jaspers, Karl. *Man in the Modern Age.* Trans. Eden and Cedar Paul. New York: Humanities Press, 1958. $3.00.

——— and Bultmann, Rudolf. *Myth and Christianity.* Trans. from the

German. New York: Noonday Press, 1958. Pp. 116. $3.00; paper, $1.25.

JEANS, JAMES. *Physics and Philosophy.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Sept., 1958. $1.75.

JENKINS, IREDELL. *Art and the Human Enterprise.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. ix + 318. $5.50.

This work has as its major intention to show the relation of art to man and to his other activities. The author begins by maintaining that human experience has three dimensions: the affective, theoretical, and the aesthetic; and that these three dimensions correspond to the three dimensions of an object: import ("value"), connectedness, and particularity. Moreover, the aesthetic experience is not merely receptive; it contains an impulse which leads to creative expression and ultimately to some external object. There is also a detailed analysis of the nature of the aesthetic object, where the author shows a similar patient inclusiveness; he argues that during the aesthetic moment of appreciation the aesthetic object is self-contained but that in its secondary status it appeals to both the affective and cognitive sides of experience.

This serious and balanced reflection upon the nature and place of art deserves wide attention.

JEVONS, W. STANLEY. *The Principles of Science. A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method.* Introd. by Ernest Nagel. 3d ed. New York: Dover Pubns., 1958. Pp. liii + 786. Paper, $2.98.

As Professor Nagel points out in his introduction the work of Jevons was one of the great formative influences on modern logic and the methodology of science. Though it has been far surpassed by modern logics, the formal analysis of Jevons was one of the first efforts made in English to use the Boolean notation and analysis. In addition, Jevons argued strongly against the theories of induction stemming from Bacon and Mill, and proposed instead the hypothetico-deductive process as the method of science. His work is still valuable, and the great number of illustrations he uses does a lot to make his analyses clear.

The edition is well printed and strongly bound, and is offered at a remarkably low price.

JOHNSON, ALLISON HEARTZ. *Whitehead's Philosophy of Civilization.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. Pp. 222. $5.00.

JONAS, HANS. *The Gnostic Religion.* Boston: Beacon Press; Oct., 1958. Pp. 320. $6.00.

JONES, ADAM LEROY. *Early American Philosophers.* New York: Frederick Ungar, 1958. Pp. 86. $2.50.

‡ KANTOROWICZ, HERMANN. *The Definition of Law.* Ed. A. H. Campbell. Introd. by A. L. Goodhart. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 135. $3.00.

KAUFMANN, WALTER. *Critique of Religion and Philosophy.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. xvii + 325. $5.00.

This book is almost a formal attack on theology of all kinds and on the Christian religion as a whole. The author makes a point of explaining that his procedure is a negative one but that he does have a positive position of his own (there are, in fact, some very religious passages in the book). There are also, and somewhat incidentally, some purely philosophical discussions.

The most philosophical chapters are the early ones on the nature of philosophy (which have some relations to Platonism and some to Pepper); the criticism of positivism (and/or analysis) and existentialism as two half-currents of the full stream of philosophy, and the chapter on the nature of truth and its relation to expe-

rience. After these chapters follow chapters on the nature of religion and faith, proofs for God, the nature of dogma and theology, the basic nature of religion, scripture and poetry. There are many quotations, and the author is a master at the apt selection of texts; he skillfully employs the art of controversy and tries to insulate himself against criticism by claiming that critics and reviewers will be unfair to him by quoting him (see especially p. 158). The polemic is often brilliant, often unfair, and sometimes resentful and bitter; it probably will sell well.

KIERKEGAARD, SØREN AABYE. *Edifying Discourses.* Ed. Paul L. Holmer. Trans. from the Swedish by David F. and Lillian Marvin Swenson. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. 284. Paper, $1.45.

‡ ——. *Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est and A Sermon.* Trans. from the Swedish with assessment by T. H. Croxall. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 196. $3.00.

‡ KITTO, H. D. F. *Sophocles, Dramatist and Philosopher.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 72. $1.20.

KLEIN, CAROL. *The Credo of Maimonides.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. 143. $3.75.

This is a study of the thought of Maimonides, intended for readers that are not specialists in philosophy. The author first gives a brief account of the life of Maimonides and his writings. Then he takes up briefly the following topics: the nature of philosophy, the existence and nature of God, the theory of truth, free will, the purpose of the world, eternity and creation in time, miracles, immortality, revelation, the resurrection, and the meaning of the Messiah. The last chapter is a commentary on the "Thirteen Articles" of faith as proposed by Maimonides.

This book is useful in that Rabbi Klein can work directly with the Hebrew terms and relates the ideas of Maimonides to the Talmud. But his understanding of the philosophical theories to which he refers (for example, he gives definitions of the term "philosophy") is apparently quite deficient and certainly awkwardly expressed (as in his summaries of philosophical positions about the proofs for the existence of God as given by modern philosophers). And it often is evident that English is not the author's native tongue. Moreover, the publisher has made it hard to tell notes from text.

‡ KNIGHT, EVERETT WARREN. *Literature Considered as Philosophy.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. 256. $5.00.

KOLESNIK, WALTER B. *Mental Discipline in Modern Education.* Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1958. Pp. 242. $3.50.

KONOPKA, GISELA. *Eduard C. Lindeman and Social Work Philosophy.* Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1958. Pp. 228. $4.50.

KOYRE, ALEXANDER. *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. 320. Paper, $1.60.

Language, Thought and Culture. Ed. Paul Henle. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958. Pp. 279. $4.95.

[LAO TZU.] *Tao Teh King.* Ed. Archie J. Bahm. New York: Frederick Ungar, 1958. Pp. 126. $2.75; paper, 95¢

LATHAM, EARL. *Philosophy and Policies of Woodrow Wilson.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; June, 1958. $5.00.

LAUER, J. QUENTIN, S.J. *Triumph of Subjectivity.* New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. lx + 185. $3.50.

LAWSON, CHESTER ALVIN. *Language, Thought, and the Human Mind.* East Lansing: Michigan State Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 123. $4.50.

‡ LECLERC, IVOR. *Whitehead's Metaphysics. An Introductory Exposition* New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. xiii + 234. $3.75.

As the author remarks, "Whitehead's writings are often rather

difficult because of his distinctive style, combining great complexity with extraordinary brevity and precision of statement. . . . all his ideas are presupposed in the discussion of each of them" (pp. x, ix).

The study begins by showing that Whitehead's metaphysics arises from the very same problem that is at the source of all the great systems of metaphysics. Its major point is the discovery and analysis of the nature of the primary instance of being—the actual entity, or *ousia*. Then the author takes up the procedure of metaphysics, showing how, for Whitehead, it is rational, speculative, and hypothetical. This introductory section of the book is Part One. Part Two deals with the doctrine of process. Here it is shown how, in terms of his requirement for the nature of metaphysics as systematic and coherent, Whitehead drives the choice between elimination of change from metaphysics on the one hand or inclusion of it in the notion of actual entity itself. In connection with process, the author explains successively the categories of creativity, eternal object, and relativity. Part Three analyzes the doctrine of experience, the rejection of the concept of vacuous actuality, prehension, feeling, and objectification. Part Four analyzes the nature of actuality; it develops the genetic analysis, the nature of God, and the universe.

Throughout, the author presents these ideas in Whitehead's own words, with copious quotations. It is an admirable piece of exposition.

‡ Leff, Gordon. *Medieval Thought from Saint Augustine to Ockham.* Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1958. Pp. 317. Paper, 85¢

This history of medieval thought is eminently readable and is not cluttered up with digressions on economics, technology, and social structures. Urbane and well-informed, the author has produced what in many ways is a sympathetic and useful history of the period. Yet, well-informed as it is, the book has many phrases that betray a lack of understanding. For example—this is one of many—"In the same way, it was a purely Christian interpretation to endow the first mover with the attributes of God as creator; from the point of view of pure reason, there is no more *evidence* for seeing Him as God than as first cause" (p. 212). If this is supposed to be a presentation of St. Thomas, the Leff-St. Thomas has been newly created; if it is a criticism—and Mr. Leff certainly has the right to criticize or disagree—it should not appear as harmlessly as it does. The whole notion that unless a philosophy somewhere contradicts faith it is not a completely distinct rational discipline would surprise most of the people with whom the author deals, except the late fourteenth-century fideists.

Leonard, Henry S. *The Principles of Right Reason: An Introduction to Applied Logic.* New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1957. Pp. 640. $5.50.

Lewis, C. S. *The Allegory of Love.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Sept., 1958. $2.25.

Literature and Belief: English Institute Essays, 1957. Ed. M. H. Abramas. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Sept., 1958. $3.75.

‡ [Locke, John.] *The Reasonableness of Christianity with: A Discourse of Miracles and Part of: A Third Letter concerning Toleration.* Ed. and abridged by I. T. Ramsey. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 102. $2.50.

Logical Positivism. Ed. A. J. Ayer. Glencoe: Free Press, 1958. $6.00.

Lynd, Helen Merrell. *On Shame and the Search for Identity.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1958. Pp. 318. $5.75.

‡ Macintyre, Alasdair Chalmers. *The Unconscious.* New York: Humanities Press, 1958. Pp. 109. $2.50.

‡ Mackinnon, D. M. *A Study in Ethical Theory.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. vii + 280. $3.25.

The author is acquainted, indeed familiar, with the trends in philosophical writing that tend to look on philosophy "as talk about talk"; witness his apologetic embarrassment in talking about awareness of freedom (pp. 124-31). Yet, as he says, a crucial question in ethical theory is that of the "possibility of metaphysics."

The arrangement of the book seems strange at first glance. Chapters on utilitarianism and Kant are followed by a chapter on the notion of moral freedom; then comes a chapter on Butler, followed by chapters on the relation of ethics to politics, and between ethics, metaphysics, and religion. Yet there is a unity, and it lies more or less in the contrast between an "intuitive ethics" and an "ethics of consequences," on the one hand, and between goodness viewed as self-perfection as against goodness as obedience to God on the other.

In his command of a complex argument and his realization of the profound bearing of the issues he takes up, the author is very impressive. He does not produce an ethical theory; he is content, at least on the surface, with discussing the nature of ethical theories produced by others. Yet at the same time he vividly conveys the impression that an ethical theory we must have, will it or not.

MacMurray, John. *The Self as Agent.* New York, Harper & Bros. $3.75.

Marcuse, Herbert. *Soviet Marxism.* New York, Columbia Univ. Press. Pp. 271. $4.50.

Margenau, Henry. *Thomas and the Physics of 1958: A Confrontation.* "The Aquinas Lecture," 1958. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. [iv] + 61. $2.50.

In this lecture, the author tries to compare some points of Thomistic epistemology with the situation of modern physics. He begins with the distinction between intellect and sense as proposed by St. Thomas and compares it to the distinction between lawful experience and theory on the one hand and historical-individual experience on the other. Next, he suggests that this difference is to be referred to the distinction between the agent and the possible intellects: the latter is merely abstractive and collative of sensory material; the former constructs theories which are not identical or even isomorphic to sense perception but merely are correlated with it. He finally suggests that the ontological dimension of reality is permitted to science, and even suggested by it, but is properly discussed only by philosophy. Finally, he argues strongly that facts and information are by no means the major part of science—that understanding is much more important and that this importance should be reflected in our teaching of science.

Maritain, Jacques. *The Degrees of Knowledge.* Trans. from the 4th French edition under the supervision of Gerald B. Phelan. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Nov., 1958. $7.50.

Martin, Harold Clifford. *The Logic and Rhetoric of Exposition.* New York: Rinehart & Co., 1958. Pp. 214. $2.00.

Mascall, E. L. *The Importance of Being Human.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Dec., 1958. Pp. 124. $2.75.

‡ Mayo, Bernard. *Ethics and the Moral Life.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958. Pp. 246. $5.00.

McGovern, William Montgomery, and Collier, David S. *Radicals and Conservatives.* Chicago: Henry Regnery & Co., 1958. Pp. 174. $4.00.

‡ McKellar, Peter. *Imagination and Thinking.* New York: Basic Books, 1958. Pp. 230. $4.25.

‡ Mehlberg, Henryk, *The Reach of Science.* Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1958. Pp. 368. $5.50.

Mill, John Stuart. *Autobiography.* Introd. by Currin V. Shields. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xviii + 201. Paper, 90¢

This is a revealing document, not only for the development of Mill's own philosophical ideas but also for the educational ideas of his father and for the psychology of character. The brief introduction is helpful in orienting the reader; there are a chronology and a selected bibliography.

The book is carefully edited, beautifully printed, and well bound, and yet its price remains within the reach of any student or scholar who wishes to possess his own copy.

———. *Utilitarianism.* [Rev. ed.] New York: Liberal Arts Press. Pp. 88. Paper, 50¢

Miller, James Wilkinson. *Logic Workbook.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. vii + 88. Paper.

These exercises, twenty-seven in number, are so arranged that they can be worked directly in the book and then turned in, or answered on blank paper. They are based on modern symbolic logic; as the author points out, there are so many different notations that it is better to write a book in English and let each instructor teach, and each class employ, their favorite system.

A Modern Introduction to Ethics. Ed. Milton K. Munitz. Glencoe: Free Press, 1958. $6.50.

Moral and Ethical Standards in Labor and Management. New York: National Assoc. of Manufacturers, 1958. Pp. 7. Paper.

Nagel, Ernest, and Newman, James R. *Godel's Proof.* New York: New York Univ. Press; Aug., 1958. $2.75.; paper, $1.75.

Nanda, B. R. *Mahatma Gandhi.* Boston: Beacon Press; Dec., 1958. Pp. 530. $6.50.

‡ Nef, John U. *Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 177. $4.00.

Neff, Mary. *Your Uncommon Sense.* Chicago: Science Research Associates; Sept., 1958. 50¢

Neill, Thomas Patrick. *Makers of the Modern Mind.* 2d enlarged ed. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. 433. $4.00.

Newman, John Henry. *Scope and Nature of University Education.* New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; Sept., 1958. Paper, $1.25.

Noble, David W. *The Paradox of Progressive Thought.* Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1958. Pp. 280. $6.00.

‡ Nowell-Smith, Patrick Horace. *Ethics.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. 283. $7.50.

O'Brien, Kevin J., c.ss.r. *The Proximate Aim of Education.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. x + 267. $5.00.

This is a dissertation presented to the Catholic University of America. The author intends to examine the true nature of Christian education and to describe and define its real end. After a brief introduction, in which he indicates his dependence on revelation and gives a eulogy of Scholastic philosophy, he analyzes the notion of finality, doing this in a relatively traditional and verbal form. Next he gives a number of opinions about the end of education offered by some modern theorists (the principle of selection is not stated or discoverable). Next come chapters on the Catholic view: the nature of Christian perfection, man's co-operation, and then the formal statement that the proper and immediate end of education is "the congruity of Christian perfection." A final chapter draws out some particular implications.

Dissertations must necessarily use technical terminology and must

compress their presentation so that only specialists can easily read what is presented. But what even professional Catholic educators will make of this philosophical reconditeness is a question.

Observation and Interpretation. Ed. Stephan Korner. New York: Academic Press, 1958. Pp. 232. $8.00.

Otto, Rudolf. *The Idea of the Holy.* Trans. from the German by John W. Harvey. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 251. Paper, $1.75.

Pap, Arthur. *Semantics and Necessary Truth.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 468. $6.75

[Pascal, Blaise.] *Pascal's Pensées.* Trans. from the French by W. F. Trotter. Introd. by T. S. Eliot. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1958. Pp. 316. Paper, $1.15.

Pasch, Alan. *The Method of Empiricism.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Dec., 1958. Pp. 304. $6.50.

Patterson, Robert Leet. *Philosophy of Religion.* New York: Henry Holt & Co.; Mar., 1958. Pp. 360.

Pepper, Stephen C. *The Sources of Value.* Berkeley, Univ. of California Press. Pp. 746. $8.50.

‡ Peters, Richard Stanley. *The Concept of Motivation.* New York: Humanities Press, 1958. Pp. 166. $2.50.

Phenix, Philip Henry. *Philosophy of Education.* New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1958. Pp. 635. $5.75.

‡ Piaget, Jean. *The Psychology of Intelligence.* New York: Humanities Press, 1958. Pp. 190. $3.75.

Pieper, Josef. *Happiness and Contemplation.* Trans. from the German by Richard and Clara Winston. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. Pp. 124. $2.75.

Poincaré, Henri. *The Value of Science.* New York: Dover Pubns.; Aug., 1958.

‡ Polanyi, Michael. *Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. xiv + 428. $6.75.

The scope of this book is human knowledge, examined in almost all of its possible manifestations in some detail; it is therefore incapable of summary. But some of its aims can be pointed out. The title itself, as the author says, is intended to show that knowledge, properly speaking, is a personal act. Claims of complete impersonality and objectivity are self-defeating, as the author makes clear. He insists strongly and with many examples on the tacit components, on the subsidiary and instrumentally known elements that surround any explicit statement. He tries to show that all knowledge, even the most abstract and formal, is rooted in non-articulated experience. He rejects also the claims of neo-behaviorism and of positivism. He shows that the notion of complete conventionality (mere usefulness) is false to the very science it is alleged to explain.

On the other hand, in his insistence on the experiential and lived grounding of all knowledge he risks blurring the difference between intellect and sense; in showing the heuristic character of science he reduces all knowledge (including a knowledge of God) to a heuristic program which belies his belief that science reaches truth and not merely efficient manipulation. This difficulty will perhaps lead many to reject the very real and profound insights of the author.

Pollard, William G. *Chance and Providence.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Sept., 1958. Pp. 180. $3.50.

Rader, Melvin. *The Enduring Questions: Main Problems in Philosophy.* New York: Henry Holt & Co. Pp. 564. $5.75.

Randall, John Herman, Jr. *Nature and Historical Experience.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press. Pp. 334. $5.50.

———. *The Role of Knowledge in Western Religion.* Boston: Beacon Press; Nov., 1958. Pp. 160. $3.50.

‡ Reeves, Joan Wynn. *Body and Mind in Western Thought.* Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1958. Pp. 403. Paper, 95¢

‡ Rosenthal, Erwin I. J. *Political Thought in Medieval Islam.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 334. $6.50.

Rothstein, Jerome. *Communication, Organization, and Science.* Foreword by C. A. Muses. Indian Hills, Colo.: Falcon's Wing Press, 1958. Pp. xcvi + 110. $ 3.50.

This extremely interesting book must be read in the spirit of the author, who professes himself a "theorist probing as deeply as he can. . . . The information-organization view is therefore pushed in many directions" (p. lxxxviii). This viewpoint is "espoused with a vigor that may seem to exclude any other approach, [but] I do not subscribe to a monistic philosophy" (p. lxxxvii).

The author begins by relating the more specialized, newer concepts of information-theory to those of entropy, and by juxtaposing the notions of measurement and communication. From this, he progresses into theories about the nature of language, logic, theory, skill. On a slightly expanded basis he considers an organism as an information-system, as well as a political society, and even a world-state. Obviously he is working with a univocal notion of *system* and consequently applies it symbolically (metaphorically).

In a lengthy foreword, Mr. Muses (pp. vii-lxxxv) gives some logical and mathematical backgrounds for the theory, expands it in some places, and in the last fourteen pages points out some reductivist statements the author makes (for example, the notion that life is a process of adjustment; that computers can write poetry or be creative).

Even with this critical view, there still are some tendencies toward monism and reductionism in the book; but a critically alerted reader will find the imaginative generalizations highly interesting.

Russell, Bertrand Arthur William. *Understanding History, and Other Essays.* New York: Philosophical Lib. Pp. 122. Paper, 95¢

‡ Samuel, Herbert Louis. *In Search of Reality.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. 237. $7.50.

Schapiro, Jacob Salwyn. *Liberalism.* Princeton: D. van Nostrand Co., 1958. Pp. 191. Paper, $1.25.

Schleiermacher, Friedrich Ernst Daniel. *On Religion.* Trans. from the 3d German ed. with introd. by Rudolph Otto. New York: Harper Bros., 1958. Pp. 309. Paper, $1.60.

Schneider, Herbert W. *The Puritan Mind.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Sept., 1958. $1.85.

Schrödinger, Erwin C. *Science, Theory and Man.* Trans. James Murphy and W. H. Johnston. Preface by Lord Rutherford. Biographical introd. by James Murphy. New York: Dover Pubns., 1958. Pp. xxiv + 223. Paper, $1.35.

Schrödinger's views on the nature and meaning of science are those of a great scientist who reflected often and deeply on these philosophical problems; they are not ill-considered and disconnected utterances. Hence, even though the epistemology is inadequate, the work remains an important source. The edition is beautifully printed and well bound.

Science and the Creative Spirit. Ed. Harcourt Brown. Toronto, Univ. of Toronto Press. Pp. xxviii + 165. $4.50.

Science and the Modern Mind: A Symposium. Ed. Gerald Holton. Boston: Beacon Press; Nov., 1958. Pp. 128. $3.95.

Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Education. Ed. Joe Park. New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. 450. $5.00.

SHEEN, FULTON J. *God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Sept., 1958. 95¢

SMITH, J. MAYNARD. *The Theory of Evolution.* Baltimore: Penguin Books; Sept., 1958. 85¢

SONDEL, BESS SELTZER. *The Humanity of Words.* Cleveland: World Pub. Co. Pp. 245. $4.00.

SPARSHOTT, F. E. *An Enquiry into Goodness.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. xiv + 304. $5.50.

This is an investigation of the meaning of "good" from the point of view of the analysis of ordinary language. The author is urbanely critical of most classical philosophers but also of the Cambridge school of analysis. Individual analyses are at times brilliant and at other times almost irritatingly short-sighted. The formula which the author arrives at is put thus: "To say that x is good is to say that it is such as to satisfy the wants of the person or persons concerned" (p. 122). The earlier sections of the book investigate such questions as the nature of a philosophical question; the later ones the primary and secondary instances of the usage of "good" and considerations of divergent philosophical interpretations of this word.

SPINOZA, BARUCH. *The Book of God.* Ed. Dagobert D. Runes. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. 121. $3.00.

This text is a revision of the translation of A. Wolf, published under the title *Spinoza's Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being.*

Revisions were made from the Dutch versions, but there are no major changes in the text. The introduction is very brief (five pages) and is as much a polemic against Christianity as it is an introduction to the thought of the Jewish author.

It is good to have an easily available edition of this philosophical classic.

———. *On the Improvement of the Understanding.* Trans. with introd. by Joseph Katz. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xx + 40. Paper, 50¢

In his general introduction, the editor claims that Spinoza was a seminal mind, foreshadowing some contemporary positions. In particular, he maintains that Spinoza's philosophy is an attempt to take science seriously. He claims that Spinoza is not a rationalist, and one of his reasons is that his views "have clear experiential reference" (p. xiii). He does show the rigid systematization of the philosophy of Spinoza, and he points out some basic general traits of the treatise. There is a very brief bibliography. The translation aims at producing a text that can be understood by a reader ignorant of Latin and traditional meanings of terms; this attempt leads to a text that is sometimes as much an interpretation as a translation.

‡ [———.] *The Political Works.* Ed. and trans. A. G. Wernham. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 473. $10.10.

STALLKNECHT, NEWTON P. *Strange Seas of Thought.* Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press; Sept., 1958. $5.00.

STANLIS, PETER J. *Edmund Burke and the Natural Law.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958. Pp. 324. $5.75.

STARK, WERNER. *The Sociology of Knowledge.* Glencoe: Free Press, 1958. $6.00.

STCHERBATSKY, T. *Buddhist Logic.* 2 vols. New York, Lounz Co. $18.50.

Strauss, Leo. *Thoughts on Machiavelli.* Glencoe: Free press, 1958. $6.00.

Studies in Ethical Theory. "University of Colorado Studies: Series in Philosophy," No. 1. Ed. Karl K. Hulley. Boulder, Colo.: Univ. of Colorado Press, 1958. Pp. 111. Paper, $2.50.

This issue contains eight papers, only one of which deals with particular considerations. Bertram Morris, in "Ethics and Human Nature," argues that good is predicated in relation to human nature, because the real essence of man is his moral nature. Edward J. Machle, in "'Human Nature' and Ethics," maintains that "human nature" can be taken in a factual descriptive sense and in a value-charged mode. In the first sense, it is not good by definition, but in the second it is; and this is because it involves the acceptance of one's self as a moral being. John O. Nelson, in "Philosophical Ethics and Morality," argues that philosophical ethics entirely dispenses with morality; for he holds that morality is the emotive good, whereas philosophy is a purely cognitive process. Robert Rogers, in "On the Justification of Ought-Statements," holds that value-statements are not descriptive and that therefore no facts ever justify a moral statement. David Hawkins, in "Ethics and Ethical Experience," argues for what he calls an "empirical realism," "empirical" in the sense that experience is relevant to the evaluation of moral judgments; "realism" in the sense that the things, objects, actions which one is judging have independent reality and value. Doris Webster Havice, in "The Need for Sound Type-Theory in Ethical Inquiry," shows the advantages of improved theories of personality types for making ethical choices. William Sacksteder, in "Human Nature, Science, and Philosophy," argues that the several sciences have each their contribution to make; that philosophy functions to some extent as a dialectic between the sciences and as a source of principles which set the very conditions under which communication is possible; and finally that philosophy has a practical function. Forrest Williams, in "What Is Truth About Man," argues that man as a whole is too complex for science and maintains that only literary creations can express the truth concerning human beings.

Sullivan, Celestine J., Jr. *Critical and Historical Reflections on Spinoza's 'Ethics.'* "University of California Publications in Philosophy," Vol. 32. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1958. Pp. 45. Paper, $1.00.

This short study of Spinoza sees in him an ambiguous as well as great thinker. As regards being and knowing, the author points out the ambiguity of the relation between substance and attribute (they are and are not identical), between two different attributes, between the attributes of thought and extension. The source of this ambiguity the author finds in the conflict between the new science and the old religion, which Descartes translated into the dualism of mind and matter, and which Spinoza tried to overcome. But the solution of the dualism by an identification of thought and extension, of idea and body, admits of two alternative readings—as idealism and as materialism—and the correctness of either one can never be established.

The rest of the first part of this paper then takes up a number of difficulties which the author sees as flowing from the basic difficulties: the notion of idea; consciousness in man and in God; cause and effect, essence; the relation of these three; the modes and the causal relation.

The second part of the paper takes up the notion of eternal life: immortality, inertia, conatus, the essence of man and his action and passion; the mind, and the ambiguity of the notion of eternal life.

The study is interesting and valuable, but there is neither a table of contents nor an index.

‡ Ta Tung Shu. *The One-World Philosophy of K'ang Yu-Wei.* Trans. from the Chinese with introd. and notes by Laurence G. Thompson. New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. 300. $6.00.

Taton, R. *Reason and Chance in Scientific Discovery.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. $10.00.

Theories of History. Ed. Patrick Gardiner. Glencoe: Free Press. 1958. $7.50.

‡ Thody, Philip. *Albert Camus: A Study of His Work.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. 155. $3 75.

Thorndike, Lynn. *A History of Magic and Experimental Science.* Vols. 7 and 8. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. Pp. 816, 707. $10.00 ea.

Thurstone, L. L. *The Measurement of Values.* Preface by Thelma Gwinn Thurstone. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Nov., 1958. Pp. 384. $7.50.

‡ Toulmin, Stephen Edelston. *The Uses of Argument.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. 1958. Pp. 270. $4.50.

Tsunoda, Ryusaku; De Bary, William Theodore; Keene, Donald. *Sources of the Japanese Tradition.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press; May, 1958. Pp. xxi + 928. $7.50.

Ullmann, Stephen. *The Principles of Semantics.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 346. $10.00.

The first edition of this work was published in 1951; the present second edition is a corrected photo-reprinting of the first edition, with an added chapter on recent developments, a new bibliography, and a new index (pp. 300-46). The "semantics" of this book is a division of linguistics, not the positivistic philosophical movement sometimes called "general semantics."

The author points out that some knowledge of the facts of linguistic usage are significant for philosophy and that philosophical theories of "meaning"—if any theories should become established—would be very important for linguistics. Frequent discussions of philosophical theories occur in various chapters.

Ushenko, Andrew Paul. *The Field Theory of Meaning.* Preface by Stephen C. Pepper. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958. Pp. 204. $4.75.

Voegelin, Eric. *Order and History.* Vol. 2, *The World of the Polis*; Vol. 3, *Plato and Aristotle.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press. Pp. 407, 400. $6.00 ea.

von Buddenbrock, Wolfgang. *The Senses.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press: May, 1958. $4.00.

von Mises, Richard. *Probability, Statistics and Truth.* 2d rev. English ed. New York, Macmillan Co. $5.00.

von Neuman, John. *The Computer and the Brain.* New Haven, Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 96. $3.00.

von Urban, Rudolf. *Beyond Human Knowledge.* New York: Pageant Press, 1958. Pp. 254. $5.00.

von Wright, George. *Treatise on Induction and Probability.* New York: Humanities Press; June, 1958.

Ward, Barbara. *Faith and Freedom.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Sept., 1958. 95¢

Warner, Rex. *The Greek Philosophers.* New York, New American Lib. Pp. 238. Paper, 50¢

‡ Warnock, G. J. *English Philosophy since 1900.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 192. $1.20.

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This is one of the classical histories of philosophy; it was one of the first to relate general history to the history of thought, and it takes a rather broad view. Yet it is in general faithful to the sources and still contains many useful analyses. The edition is well bound and economical; the original printing seems not to have been even and clean.

WOLTER, ALLAN BERNARD, O.F.M. *Summula Metaphysicae.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. xii + 189. $3.50.

This Latin text of metaphysics was written for use in Franciscan seminaries, according to the announcement of the publishers. The author, by distinguishing the common patrimony of the Scholastics from particular and controverted opinions, would seem to have had in mind at the same time the establishing of a common understanding among many schools of thought. And it is to be hoped that this book will be available to a much wider circle of students, even where it is not adopted as a textbook.

The book is divided into four parts: (I) transcendental being and its general attributes; (II) the "disjunctive attributes" which make up the basic divisions of being; (III) the existence and nature of God, in a rather brief treatment; (IV) ontological truth and goodness. The Latin text is clear, simple, and direct, and a set of review questions at the end should help the student to prepare for the final examination. There is a useful introductory bibliography which emphasizes English-language books and articles, and a good index.

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